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Introduction
Within the last decade, there has been a concerted effort from a number of
sources to control the pervasive and persistent problem of corruption'
1. In 1967 John Nye defined corruption as private-regarding pecuniary or status
gains or exercise of private-regarding influence. SeeJohn S. Nye, Corruption and Political
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among the international business community. Corruption undermines
democracy and development, fundamentally distorts public policy, dis-
courages investment, leads to the misallocation of resources, discriminates
against the poor, and destroys public confidence in democratic govern-
ment.2 Despite the enhanced global awareness of the corrosive effects of
corruption within the political, economic, and social spheres, there pres-
ently are no dear, definitive indications that the occurrence of corruption
has declined.3 A recent Gallup poll commissioned by Transparency Inter-
national (TI).4 found that thirty-three percent of the 779 multinational
executives surveyed believe that the problem of corruption in the business
world is worsening.5 Commenting on the Gallup Poll survey, TI's Chair-
man, Peter Eigen, said that "[t]he data provides [sic] a disturbing picture of
the degree to which leading exporting countries are perceived to be using
corrupt practices."6 In a statement made in 1999, David Aaron, Undersec-
retary of Commerce for International Trade, noted that "there is a huge
amount of money at stake. Just last year, there have been allegations of
foreign bribery in 55 contracts worth $37 billion."'7
Subsequent to the initial passage of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act (FCPA) 8 in 1977, there have been several significant developments,
such as the adoption in 1997 of the Organization of Economic Coopera-
tion and Development (OECD) Convention on Combating Bribery of For-
Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis, 61 Am. POL. Sci. REV. 417, 419 (1967). The work-
ing definition provided by Transparency International (TI) is that corruption is an abuse
of entrusted power for private profit. See Barbara C. George & Kathleen A. Lacey, On the
Threshold of the Adoption of Global Antibribery Legislation: A Critical Analysis of Current
Domestic and International Efforts Toward the Reduction of Business Corruption, 32 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 17 (1999).
2. See Augustin Gurza, In Mexico, Corruption Can Be Hazardous to One's Health,
L.A. TIMEs, May 25, 1999, at B1; Peter Eigen, The Central Role of Civil Society in Com-
bating Corruption in the Era of Globalisation, Address to the Carter Center "Trans-
parency for Growth" Conference (May 4, 1999) (transcript available at Transparency
Int'l, Key TI Speeches <http://wvw.transparency.de/documents/speeches/pecarter_
address.html>) [hereinafter Eigen Address].
3. See Philip Segal, Despite Laws, Bribery Thrives, Executives Say, Irr'L HERALD TRIB.,
Jan. 21, 2000, at 13.
4. TI is a nongovernmental organization based in Berlin and established for the
purpose of targeting and exposing worldwide corruption. See generally Transparency
International, Press Release: Transparency International Publishes 1997 Corruption Percep-
tions Index (visited Jan. 26, 2001) <http://www. transparency.de/documents/press-
releases/1997/1997.31.7.cpi.html>.
5. See generally Segal, supra note 3.
6. Transparency Int'l, Press Release: New Poll Shows Many Leading Exporters Using
Bribes (Oct. 26, 1999) <http://www.transparency.de/documents/cpi/cpi-bpipress-
release.htnl>.
7. International Trade Ass'n, Press Release by Undersecretary of Commerce, David
Aaron, Special "On-Line" Hotline to Combat Bribery of Foreign Officials (June 30, 1999)
<http://www.ita.doc.gov/media/0630bribery.htn>. Unless otherwise noted, references
to monetary figures are in U.S. dollars.
8. Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a,
78m, 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78ff) (amending scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-78kk
(1994)), amended by International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub.
L. No. 105-366, 112 Stat. 3302.
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eign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (OECD
Convention)9 and the inception of active non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) like TI. Despite these developments, current evidence of extensive
business corruption shows that critical gaps remain in the mechanisms
used to fight corruption. Closing these gaps will require heightened aware-
ness by and increased cooperation among diverse entities. First, there
must be a means to establish leverage over the public sector procurement
process. Second, cultural attitudes toward corruption must be modified.
Other necessary strategic components are grassroots initiatives within
developing nations, the homes of many of the bribe-takers, to mobilize civil
society10 and the private sector. Cooperation among all entities
involved-government officials, legislatures, multilateral development insti-
tutions, industry groups, trade unions, and civil society in both developing
and industrialized nations-will be necessary to eliminate global business
corruption.
This article (1) discusses why the emerging global economy creates an
environment that requires integrity in the marketplace; (2) demonstrates
the inability of purely legislative measures to eradicate corruption; (3) sum-
marizes the nature and costs, both social and economic, of business cor-
ruption; (4) describes current anti-corruption initiatives by industrialized
nations; (5) reviews grassroots initiatives by NGOs to combat corruption;
(6) analyzes the role of multilateral development banks in tying aid to
meeting anti-corruption requirements; (7) evaluates current anti-corrup-
tion agendas emanating from developing countries; and (8) recommends a
strategy to unite the diverse entities necessary to a successful campaign
against corruption.
This article focuses primarly on business entities within industrialized
countries who bribe government officials in developing nations,1 1 but it
should be noted that corrupt acts also occur between business entities in
industrialized countries and government officials in developed nations.
However, corruption is not as common between companies in developing
nations and the government officials in developed countries, presumably
because their current economic relationship does not provide the
opportunity.
I. Background
International business transactions carry the inherent threat and tempta-
tion for bribery and corruption. Bribery is arguably the most detrimental
9. Dec. 18, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1 [hereinafter OECD Convention].
10. "Civil society" in this context applies to "all those elements of society, and all
those arrangements within it, that exist outside the state's reach or instigation." David
Rieff, The False Dawn of Civil Society, NATION, Feb. 22, 1999, at 11.
11. Ten of these developing nations, including Mexico, Brazil, the People's Republic
of China, India, and Indonesia, have been labeled as big emerging markets, or 'BEMS,' by
the Commerce Department. While these rapidly growing markets present great oppor-
tunities for investment, several of these BEMS are viewed as being among the worlds'
most corrupt nations.
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corrupt practice to extraterritorial business transactions, 12 and bribery of
foreign public officials for the purpose of influencing the award of interna-
tional contracts is ubiquitous. Statistics show that in the five years from
April 1994 to April 1999, bribes to foreign officials played a role in the
award of 294 contracts worth about $145 billion.13 According to U.S.
Commerce Department figures, U.S. businesses collectively lost $37 billion
worth of overseas contracts in 1998 because of foreign bribery. 14
Bribery in business transactions occurs in a variety of industries,
including military procurement, aerospace, infrastructure, energy, and
transportation. Corruption has even been alleged to have penetrated the
inner circles of the World Bank (Bank), the multilateral financial organiza-
tion that ostensibly campaigns against corruption when loaning money to
countries.15 Only a handful of large multinational corporations based in
wealthy industrialized nations commit the vast majority of corrupt
transactions. 16
Bribery assumes many forms and, due to its characteristically clandes-
tine nature, it is often difficult to detect. 17 The origins of bribery can be
traced back for centuries from several cultures and religions.18 Today,
12. See Steven R. Salbu, Bribery in the Global Market, A Critical Analysis of the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 229, 256 (1997). U.S. companies have
lost billions of dollars in business to foreign companies that pay bribes. Id. (citing Amy
Borrus, A World of Greased Palms: Inside the Dirty War for Global Business, Bus. WK., Nov.
6, 1995, at 36, 37; Robert S. Greeberger, Foreingers Use Bribes to Beat U.S. Rivals in Many
Deals, New Report Concludes, WALL ST. J., Oct. 12, 1995, at A3).
13. See OECD, Fact Sheet: OECD Anti-Bribery Convention June 30, 1999) <http:/
www.ita.doc.gov/media/0630factsheet.htm>; Glenn R. Simpson, Foreign, Deals Rely on
Bribes, U.S. Contends, WA L. ST. J., Feb. 23, 1999, at A3.
14. See Scott Doggett & Annette Haddad, Commercial Bribery Under Attack, L.A.
TiMEs, Mar. 20, 2000, at C2.
15. See Lorraine Adams, World Bank Discovers Possible Fraud, INT'L HERALD TRIB.,
July 17, 1998, at 1. A civil lawsuit was brought against a former Bank official, Fritz
Rodriguez, in U.S. District Court for recovery of tens of thousands of dollars in alleged
kickbacks that the World Bank believes the defendant took from a contractor on a water
utility project in Algeria. Id.
16. See Simpson, supra note 13.
17. The following story was related by a commercial counselor of a European gov-
ernment regarding the great ingenuity displayed in devising methods of illegal payoffs:
[A]fter long-but unsuccessful-efforts to sell ... road machinery to the Minister
of Public Works of a certain Caribbean nation[, one] ambassador suggested a
payoff to the Minister .... Knowing the Minister was a bibliophile, he acquired
a first edition of a classic book and inserted $20,000 between its pages. He then
called on the Minister and presented the book "with the compliments and best
wishes" of his country. The Minister thanked him, thumbed through the pages
of the book, noted the contents, and calmly laid down the book with the remark,
"Mr. Counselor, I understand that this book has been published in a two-volume
edition." The counselor... knew that he could not double the bribe. Being
quick-witted, however, he replied, "Mr. Minister, my government is unable to
give you the two-volume edition, but we will supply an appendix." An order for
the machinery was soon executed!
NEIL H. JAcOBY ET AL., BRIBERY AND EXTORTION IN WORLD BUSINESS 197 (1977).
18. See JOHN T. NooNAN, BRIBES 12-30 (1984). Bribery, in the context of "oppressive
gift taking," can be traced back at least as early as 1500 B.C. in Egypt, Mesopotamia,
Assyria, and Babylonia. Id.
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bribery of public officials and government workers may assume the form
of a cash payment,19 a deposit to a designated offshore account, 20 or a
consulting fee.2 1 A bribe may be disguised as a gift, a token of apprecia-
tion for some completely separate and legitimate purpose,2 2 or as a travel
disbursement to finance a resort vacation.23 Also, there are questionable
areas of alleged corruption, such as cronyism, favoritism, nepotism, and
patronage. 2 4
Bribery is usually an effective means of obtaining business contracts.
Companies that allegedly engage in systematic bribery regularly become
the successful bidders.25 However, it is possible for these companies to be
out-bribed by competitors.2 6
A. Why the Emerging Global Economy Creates an Environment that
Requires Integrity in the Marketplace
Globalization is a modern phenomenon that has ushered in a new busi-
ness dynamic and era of social stability. The Cold War era, which ended in
1989 with the fall of the Berlin Wall, was characterized by its emphasis on
nation-states divided by political ideologies. 2 7 The international system of
globalization which followed the Cold War has created an integration of
nation-states, bound together by the Internet and other barrier-breaking
19. See, e.g., Don Kirk, Foes in Seoul Say 'Mr. Clean' Is Losing Fight on Corruption,
INT'L HERALD TRIB., Aug. 4, 1999, at 1. Lim Chang Yuel, governor of a province near
Seoul, South Korea, was charged with taking more than $400,000 in bribes from a bank
executive who was attempting to prevent the government from closing his insolvent
bank. This was particularly embarrassing because Mr. Lim had been the finance minis-
ter in 1997 and had negotiated for the International Monetary Fund to bail out Korea's
troubled economy. Id.
20. See, e.g., Michael R. Gordon, Neela Banerjee, Eric Schmitt, Tales of Corruption in
Russia and a 'Lapse' by Bank of New York, INr'L HERALD TaIB. (Sept. 24, 1999) at 23. At
the center of a scandal involving alleged money-laundering by Russians, including high
level Kremlin officials, was an "offshore" account at the Bank of New York used to
deposit approximately four billion dollars a day. Id. Ordinarily, offshore accounts are
in places like the Cayman Islands, Liechtenstein, or Switzerland. The offshore financial
centers that handle the illicit wealth are now being targeted by TI in a call for the interna-
tional community to declare as "banking outlaws" those institutions that do not adhere
to international standards. Id.
21. See, e.g., Glenn R. Simpson, Mobil Defends Payments Made to Panamanians, WALL
ST.J., Apr. 5, 1999, at A24. Mobil was accused of paying "$2.7 million in consulting fees
after securing the right to operate a Panama Canal fueling terminal formerly used by the
U.S. government." Id.
22. See Kirk, supra note 19, at 4. The Environment Minister in South Korea, an
actress by profession, was forced to resign after businesses "plied her with about $
20,000 to thank her for a performance in Moscow during a state visit there earlier in the
year." Id.
23. Depending on the country the officials are from, the total per diem paid during
their visit could be the equivalent of more than a year's salary.
24. SeeJames Cox, Asia Shakes Up Cozy, Corrupt Business Practices, USA TODAY, Jan.
28, 1998, at 4B; Helmut Sohmen, Critical Importance of Controlling Corruption, 33 INT'L
LAw. 863, 866 (1999).
25. See generally Salbu, supra note 12.
26. See generally Simpson, supra note 21.
27. See THOMAS L. F~iEDMAN, THE Laxus AND THE OLlvE TREE 7, 8 (2000).
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technologies.28
For business, technology has contributed to the creation of a
borderless economy; for society, both the removal of restrictions on inter-
national commerce and the integration of nation-states into collectives
such as the European Union diminish the likelihood of a third World
War.u9 The globalization trend is likely to continue as a result of these
benefits.
A recent study on globalization shows that those nations which most
opened their markets to free trade enjoyed not only tremendous economic
growth but also striking social improvements. 30 Globalization brings with
it an increase in economic growth and an expansion of trade and com-
merce. Unfortunately, with the expansion of commercial opportunity
comes the specter of corruption fueled by increased competition for lucra-
tive contracts. James Wolfensohn, President of the World Bank, asserts
that "corruption is the biggest issue on the minds of voters and the single
inhibiting factor for private investment."31 Tolerance for inefficiencies,
such as corruption, has become much lower as a result of globalization.32
A country cannot remain competitive and attractive to foreign investors if it
has a reputation for a corrupt and inefficient government. 33
Despite the immense amount of negative publicity surrounding global-
ization, as evident at the World Trade Organization's (WTO) 1999 meeting
held in Seattle 34 and, more recently, in Prague,35 globalization conceivably
could forward anti-corruption initiatives by coordinating the efforts of mul-
tilateral organizations. As one example of this potential, Dai Xianglong,
Chief of China's central bank, recently announced reforms intended to
combat fraud and corruption, which were motivated primarily by China's
efforts to gain entry into the WTO.36 "Such reforms are intended to assist
the transition of China's state banks from ailing institutions into sound
commercial enterprises. '37
TI's Chairman has offered a good explanation for why bribery cannot
be allowed to continue unchecked in a globalized society. Eigen asserts
that "[c]orruption... undermines good government, fundamentally dis-
28. See id. at 8, 9.
29. The integration of European countries into the European Union is an example of
this. See Chantal Momege & Valerie Landes, European Law, 32 INr'L. LAw. 387 (1998).
30. See Flora Lewis, No, Globalization Isn't a Menace to Social Values, (Feb. 19, 2000)
<http://web.nps.navy.mil/-relooney/3041-1355.htm>.
31. Sougata Mukkerjee, Open Markets Spawn Corruption, Bus. NEws, Sept. 22, 1997,
at 2.
32. See generally Sohmen, supra note 24.
33. See FriEDMAN, supra note 27, at 9, 180.
34. See Thomas L. Friedman, Senseless in Seattle, L. B. PREss TELEGRAM, Dec. 3, 1999,
at A25; Kenneth Klee, The Siege of Seattle, TIME, Dec. 13, 1999, at 32.
35. See Joseph Kahn, Protestors Battle Police in Prague, IN'L. HERALD TiaB., Sept. 27,
2000, at 1.
36. See Erik Eckholm, China to Reform Banking Sector, INAr'. HERALD TRIB., Jan. 21,
2000, at 13. China plans to enforce a "real name rule" which will discontinue the prior
rule of allowing the hiding of money gained through bribery, embezzlement, or other
nefarious ways under an unlimited number of false names. Id.
37. Id.
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torts public policy, leads to the misallocation of resources, harms the pri-
vate sector and private sector development and particularly hurts the
poor."38 "[B]y undermining trust in political institutions and public offi-
cials and by distorting government policy against the best interests of the
majority, corruption impairs the process of democracy."3 9 Democratic ide-
als may not appeal to all members of the global economy; however, as
countries with vastly different political, social, and economic ideologies are
drawn into the world market, each must realize the necessity of providing a
level playing field, if only in order to increase the confidence of their pro-
spective trading partners.
Some economists have advanced the argument that bribery can be
very useful in underdeveloped economies, serving as an "oiling of the
wheels" to accelerate economic growth.40 However, in the context of the
modern global economy, and according to clearly defined institutional
organization charts,4 1 this argument no longer appears credible. One need
look no further than the crisis caused in Indonesia, where President
Suharto amassed a family fortune of $30 billion by bestowing lucrative
contracts to his children and ignoring bids by contractors who would oth-
erwise have been successful under a competitive bidding process.4 2 The
economic distortions caused by Suharto's nepotism crippled Indonesia's
intra-national competition and seriously curtailed foreign investment, con-
tributing to Indonesia's 1998 economic crisis. 43
B. Prevailing Cultural Attitudes That Affect Prevention of Business
Corruption
The culture of the country in which a business transaction occurs often
determines the character of the transaction. 44 As examples, political pay-
ments are a feature of Middle Eastern life, where the payment of baksheesh
in the Arabic and Turkish-speaking countries, and of roshveh in Iran is
embedded in the social and cultural fabric of these countries. 45 In Nigeria
and other former British West African colonies, functionaries often expect
or seek a tip, referred to as "dash," for services rendered to the public.4 6 If
no dash is given, the service may be denied. In the former British colony
38. Eigen Address, supra note 2; see also Transparency Int'l, Press Release, supra note
4.
39. Peter Eigen, Combating Corruption around the World, 7 J. DEMOCRACY 158, 160
(Jan. 1996).
40. See, e.g., Sohmen, supra note 24, at 866.
41. See id. at 867.
42. See Philip Shenon, IMF Storms Indonesia's Family Citadel, INT'L HERALD TRuB.,Jan.
17-18, 1998, at 1.
43. See id.
44. See Steven R. Salbu, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act as a Threat to Global Har-
mony, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 419, 422-26 (1999).
45. See NooNAN, supra note 18, at 7. According to Professor Noonan, this can be
traced to the days of Ottoman rule and derives from the historical presence of the all-
powerful state. The political payment was an accepted method by which the tyranny of
the ruler and venality of his officials were curbed.
46. See id. at 13.
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of India/Pakistan, decades of corruption of government officials by local
businesses have firmly established payoffs as an integral part of business-
government relations.47 Brilery in some nations is so entwined in normal
business practice that many of the home countries of active corporate brib-
ers had, until recently, laws making the bribes tax deductible.48
In the United States, the motivation to pass the FCPA probably derived
from the strong Puritan religious background fostered among the set-
tlers.49 Puritan religious ideology fundamentally influenced the American
sense of morality.50 Many Puritans equated success in business with proof
of divine favor and predestination for salvation.5' Given this origin of
American morality, the passage of the FCPA during President Jimmy
Carter's term in office52 seems to have been a by-product of the righteous
indignation and political backlash following the Watergate affair.5 3 In
many Asian, African, and Middle Eastern countries, the basic view of
morality may be quite different from that found in the United States.
In general, a symbiotic relationship often arises between cultures of
industrialized and developing nations. As a result of colonial domination
and poverty, government officials in developing countries rely upon bribes
to ensure their livelihood. These government have come to rely on the
receipt of payoffs, and businesses within industrialized nations have tasted
the vast profits inherent in corrupt transactions. A vicious cycle of corrup-
tion arises out of this symbiotic relationship.
C. Inability of Legislative Measures to Eradicate Corruption
The United States began the effort to achieve a legislative solution to extra-
territorial bribery in 1977 with the FCPA, the first legislative measure to
47. See id. at 14. Robert Wade's description of corrupt engineers dealing with the
allocation of water rights to farmers in Southern India provides an interesting example
of creative opportunism by the engineers. Those farmers who are upstream paid bribes
to gain assurance that the water would be forthcoming while the farmers at the end of
the irrigation canal had to pay the engineers to gain water which otherwise might not
have been available. See generally Robert Wade, The System of Administrative and Politi-
cal Corruption: Canal Irrigation in South India, 14 J. DEv. STUD. 287 (1982); see also
Claire Moore Dickerson, Political Corruption, Free-Flowing Opportunism, 14 CONN. J.
IN'L L. 393, 395 (1999).
48. See id.; see also Beverly McLachlin, Horchelaga Lecture: Criminal Law: Towards an
International Legal Order, 29 HONG KONG LJ. 448, 450 (1999).
49. See JAcoBY ET AL., supra note 17, at 197.
50. See, e.g., Roger Hill, History of Work Ethic (visited Jan. 26, 2001) <http://
www.coe.uga.edu/-rhill/workethic/hist.htm> JAcoBY Er AL., supra note 17, at 197.
51. SeeJAcoBY r AL., supra note 17, at 197.
52. President Carter, a Democrat, was well known for his moralistic views. In his
inaugural address, Carter began establishing the framework for discussion of what
would become the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: "To be true to ourselves, we must be
true to others. We will not behave in foreign places so as to violate our rules and stan-
dards here at home, for we know that the trust which our nation earns is essential to our
strength." President's Inaugural Address, 1 PuB. PAPERs 1, 1-4 (1997).
53. See GLADYs ENGEL-LANG & KURT LANG, THE BATTLE FOR PUBuc OPINION 45-47
(1983). Details substantiating the connection between the break-in at the Watergate
Apartments, the Nixon administration, and the President's re-election committee were
uncovered several months after the election. Id.
Cornell International Law Journal
criminalize bribery.54 Despite the strong support of the Department ofJus-
tice (DOJ) and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), enforcement
of the FCPA was minimal.55 U.S. businesses secretly continued to bribe
foreign government officials.5 6 Its passage signified the U.S. government's
unilateral stance against business corruption and resulted in prolonged,
vehement objection by the U.S. business community.
The principal objection to the FCPA was that American companies
doing business abroad were now placed in the untenable position of com-
peting for contracts against other businesses that were free of FCPA-like
restrictions.5 7 Businesses applied pressure to members of Congress to
repeal the FCPA. Congress capitulated to some extent by amending the
FCPA provisions to clarify the parameters of conduct categorized as brib-
ery.5 8 The FCPA amendments, contained in the 1988 Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Trade Act,5 9 considerably reduced the strength of the
harshest provisions of the FCPA but increased penalties for other viola-
tions.60 Despite the various amendments to the FCPA, the mere passage of
legislation criminalizing extraterritorial bribery has not adequately
addressed the problem of bribery by U.S. firms.6 1
Fortuitously, a number of precipitating factors during the same time
period as the 1988 amendments to the FCPA directed global attention
towards the eradication of bribery of government officials by businesses. 62
Notably, the legislative approach contained in the FCPA was adopted by
54. See Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1997).
55. See Christopher F. Corr &Judd Lawler, Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don't,
The OECD Convention and the Globalization of Anti-Bribery Measures, 32 VAND. J. TitANS-
NAT'L. L. 1249, 1254 (1999).
56. See United States v. Goodyear Int'l Corp., 2 FCPA Rep. 698.1610 (D.D.C. 1989);
United States v. Lockheed Corp., 3 FCPA Rep. 699.131 (N.D. Ga. 1995); United States v.
Mead, 3 FCPA Rep. 699.533 (D.NJ. 1998).
57. See MichaelJ. Hershman, Criminalized Foreign Bribery Will Improve Trade, NAT.'L
LJ. Apr. 27, 1998, at A23; see George & Lacey, supra note 1, at 19.
58. The FCPA was amended in 1988 by the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amend-
ments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1415.
59. See id.
60. See id. Persons who are directors, officers, etc., may be criminally fined up to
$100,000. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(g) (1988). A person who willfully violates a provi-
sion may be imprisoned up to five years. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(g)(2)(A), (B). Corpora-
tions convicted of willful violations are subject to fines up to $2 million. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 78dd-2(g)(1)(A).
61. See Transparency Int'l, The 1999 Bribe Payer's Index (Oct. 26, 1999) <http://
www.transparency.de/documents/cpi/bps.html>. The 1999 Bribe Payers Index (BPI)
lists the United States as having a score of 6.2 on a scale in which ten represents a low
perceived level of bribery and zero indicates a high level of bribery. See Doggett &
Haddad, supra note 14, for mention of Lockheed Corp. paying a record $24.5 million in
penalties in 1995 for illegally paying an Egyptian official $1 million to win an aircraft
contract. See also Lockheed Corp., 3 FCPA Rep. at 699.175 (N.D. Ga. 1995). This is the
same Lockheed that was involved in the 1970s during the Watergate scandal in paying
$1 million to Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands, $1.7 million to Japanese officials, and
$2 million to Italian officials to obtain or retain contracts while at the same time Con-
gress was guaranteeing $250 million in loans to keep the company from going into bank-
ruptcy. See also Corr & Lawler, supra note 55, at 1277.
62. See Gail Edmondson et al., Europe's New Morality, Bus. WK., Dec. 18, 1995, at 26.
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two major multilateral organizations. In 1996, the Inter-American Conven-
tion Against Corruption (OAS Convention)6 3 was adopted by member
nations of the Organization of American States (OAS). 6 4 Additionally,
OECD members6 5 became signatories in 1997 to a similar treaty making
extraterritorial bribery of government officials illegal, the Convention on
Combating Bribery in International Business Transactions (OECD Conven-
tion).6 6 However, both the OAS and OECD require their signatories to pass
domestic implementing legislation,6 7 and the success of these conventions
ultimately will depend upon the penalty structure and enforcement mea-
sures adopted by individual signatories.
The issue remains whether legislative measures can sufficiently deter
businesses from engaging in bribery. The effectiveness of such a legislative
approach is undermined in a market economy where the drive for profit
dominates. A foreign company's quickest route to maximizing profits in
developing and transitional nations may indeed be bribery of a public offi-
cial. Although some view the legal system as a cure for market imperfec-
tions,68 one of the reasons that law sometimes fails to compel ethical
conduct in the operation of businesses may simply be that the potential for
huge profits makes violation of the law seem worth the risk of punishment.
Businesses may have a sufficient interest in the continuance of profits
connected with bribery such that legislation alone cannot cure the prob-
lem. An example is the continued operation of the drug cartels in Mexico
and other Central and South American countries despite the presence of
strict anti-drug laws and the dedicated efforts of law enforcement. 69 The
63. Mar. 26, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 724 [hereinafter OAS Convention]. Signatories include:
Argentina, the Bahamas, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Domini-
can Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mex-
ico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Surinam, Trinidad and Tobago, United States,
Uruguay, and Venezuela. See id.
64. See id. The OAS has thirty-four Western Hemisphere members, including the
United States.
65. See OECD, What is OECD[?], (visited Jan. 26, 2001) <http//www.oecd.org/
about/general/index.htm>. The twenty-nine signatory members of the OECD are Aus-
tralia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tur-
key, the United Kingdom and the United States. Additionally, there are five non-mem-
bers are signatories, including Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, and the Slovak
Republic. OAS signatories include Argentina, the Bahamas, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada,
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suri-
nam, Trinidad and Tobago, the United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela. See id.; OECD
Convention, supra note 9; OAS Convention, supra note 63.
66. OECD Convention, supra note 9.
67. See OAS Convention, supra note 63; OECD Convention, supra note 9.
68. See EDvARD J. CoNRY nEr AL., THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT or BusiNESs 37 (1990).
69. See Andrew Gumbel, Crocodile Tears on Mexico's Wild Border, but Guns and Drugs
Won't Go Away, INDEP. (London), Mar. 19, 2000 at 32. The drug cartels not only con-
tinue their illegal practices, but also sometimes murder law enforcement officials who
interfere with their activities. See id.
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lure of tremendous profits sometimes can drive otherwise ethical people to
engage in unacceptable, and even illegal, activity.
II. Summary of Initiatives by Multilateral Institutions and Developed
Nations
Numerous, scandalous accounts of corruption throughout the world-
including Indonesia, the European Union, the United States, and South
Korea, to name a few-have focused public attention on the negative impact
of corruption.70 Consequently, in the last decade, a coalescence of initia-
tives has resulted in a significant effort by industrialized nations to target
business corruption.7 1 A number of the more notable actions taken to
combat corruption are discussed below.
A. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
An examination of the development of the FCPA is essential to a proper
understanding of the recent OECD and OAS Conventions. Both conven-
tions were modeled in part after the FCPA, and these multilateral organiza-
tions were able to take advantage of the successes and failures of the
original U.S. legislation and its amendments.
72
1. Original Statutory Language
The state of mind of the international business community prior to the
initial adoption of the FCPA is apparent from the following statement made
by Carl Kotchian, President of Lockheed Corporation from 1969 until
1977:
I knew that if we wanted our product to have a chance to win on its own
merits, we had to follow the functioning system .... If we wanted our prod-
uct to have a chance, we understood that we would have to pay, or pledge to
pay, substantial sums of money in addition to the contractual sales
commission.7
3
Prior to 1977, payoffs were viewed as expected and necessary. In response
to this view, Congress addressed bribery in international business transac-
tions by adopting the anti-bribery and accounting provisions of the 1977
FCPA.7 4
70. See, e.g., Roger Cohens & John Tagliabue, A New Kohl Era Scandal: Kickbacks;
$70 Million in Illegal Payments is Separate from Party Funds Inquiry, INT'L HERALD TRIB.,
Feb. 8, 2000, at 1; Alan Friedman, Berlusconi Gets 2d Conviction in Week, IrNr'L HERALD
TRIB.,July 14, 1998, at 1; Indonesia Is Said to Seek Scandal Secrecy, INT'L HERALD TRIBUNE,
Sept. 16, 1999, at 19; Overseer Tells Bosnia to Fight Corruption, Irr'L HERALD TRB., Aug.
19, 1999, at 6; Edward T. Pound & Kevin Johnson, Exec Pleads Guilty in IOG Bribery
Case, USA TODAY, Aug. 4, 1999, at IA; Thomas Sanction, Cherchez la Femmel: Tripped
Up by a High Living Friend, France's Fifth Highest Official Is Probed for Corruption, TIME,
May 11, 1998 at 34.
71. See generally George & Lacey, supra note 1.
72. Interestingly, ten years later, there was a role reversal as Congress looked to the
OECD when modeling additional amendments to the FCPA.
73. CHRISTOPHER ENGLHOLM, WHEN BusiNEss EAST MEETS BUSINESS WEST 238 (1991).
74. Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977).
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a. Anti-bribery Provisions
The 1977 Act included prohibitions against (1) the direct and indirect brib-
ery of foreign officials 75 by issuers and reporting firms under the jurisdic-
tion of the SEC, 76 and (2) the direct and indirect bribery of foreign officials
by domestic concerns, including any U.S. citizen, national, or resident, and
any business entity organized under U.S. law.77 Through the use of the
terms "issuers" and "domestic concerns," SEC registrants and non-regis-
trants alike were covered by the FCPA and its resultant amendments to the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.78 These terms continue to be used in the
same context under the 1988 amendments to the Act.79
One major focal point of criticism involved the Act's intent require-
ment. The original 1977 Act gave prosecutors an advantage in carrying the
burden of proof against a defendant regarding the requisite intent for viola-
tions, and this advantage caused a great deal of concern within the busi-
ness community. The original prohibition covered acts committed "while
knowing or having reason to know" that sums of money paid would be used
to bribe a foreign official.80 Congress would later remove the "reason to
know" language in the 1988 amendments, and the phrase has not reap-
peared in any subsequent iterations of the FCPA, the OAS and OECD Con-
ventions, or in any implementing legislation adopted in other countries.
b. Accounting Provisions
Congress passed the accounting provisions 8l of the FCPA as part of a
series of amendments to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Unlike the
anti-bribery sections,8 2 which apply to both "issuers and domestic con-
cerns," the accounting provisions apply only to "issuers" registered under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The provisions represented an
attempt to handle the broader problem of corporate concealment of illicit
payments, which businesses under SEC jurisdiction often had disguised by
means of improper accounting procedures. Although the language has
been clarified, the corporate governance approach embedded in the
accounting provisions has remained a part of all subsequent legislation.
The 1977 Act swept broadly, and required every issuer of registered
75. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(2). A "foreign official" was defined by the Act as "any
officer or employee of a foreign government, or any department, agency or instrumental-
ity thereof, or any person acting in an official capacity for or on behalf of any such
government or department, agency of instrumentality." Id. The term did not include
employees of a foreign government whose duties are essentially ministerial or clerical.
"Facilitating" or so-called "grease" payments made to these types of foreign government
employees were specifically excluded. See id.
76. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(a) (1977).
77. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(a) (1977).
78. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1988).
79. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a), 78dd-2(a), (h), 78m(b)(2) (1997).
80. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(a)(3) (1982) (emphasis added).
81. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2) (1977).
82. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2 (1998).
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securities 83 to (1) make and keep books, records, and accounts which
accurately and fairly reflect, in reasonable detail, transactions and disposi-
tions of assets, and (2) devise and maintain a system of internal account-
ing. As one writer described it, an American company need be neither
foreign nor corrupt to come within the scope of the accounting sections of
the FCPA.8 4 Because of confusion about interpretation of the language
used, Congress added clarifying details in the 1988 amendments.8 5
c. Enforcement Authority
The FCPA divides enforcement authority between the DOJ and the SEC.
The DOJ is responsible for criminal enforcement of the anti-bribery provi-
sions8 6 and for civil enforcement actions involving domestic concerns.8 7
The SEC has the authority to investigate and initiate the civil prosecution of
issuers under the anti-bribery and accounting provisions of the FCPA.88
2. Passage of the 1988 Amendments in an Attempt to Overcome Criticisms
of the Business Community Regarding the Negative Effect of the FCPA
on Competitiveness
Business critics voiced dissatisfaction with the FCPA, arguing that it disad-
vantaged American companies because competitor companies from other
countries bidding on the same contract remained free to bribe. Critics also
objected to key words and phrases in the Act that were not adequately
defined.8 9 As an indication of the level of dissatisfaction with the 1977
Act, Congress introduced minor amendments in 1980, 1981, 1984, and
1985.90 Finally, in 1988, Congress passed a series of major amendments
to the Act that considerably reduced the stringency of many of the provi-
sions but, as if to salve their conscience, substantially increased the penal-
ties for violation.9 1
83. Section 102 of the FCPA imposes these requirements on every company having a
class of securities registered pursuant to section 12 of the 1934 Act and every company
required to file regular disclosure reports under § 15(d) of the 1934 Act. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 78m(b)(2) (1988).
84. See LAMBERT H. SPRONK, THE FINANCIAL EXECUTIVE'S HANDBOOK FOR MANAGING
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONs 264 (1980).
85. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(5) (1988).
86. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(d) (1982).
87. See id.
88. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2(d), 78ff(c) (1998).
89. See Barbara C. George, The U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: The Price Business
Is Paying for the Unilateral Criminalization of Bribery, 4 INT'LJ. MGMT. 394, 395 (1987).
90. See generally Laura E. Longobardi, Reviewing the Situation: What Is To Be Done
With The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act?, 20 VANDERBILT J. TRANSNAT'L L. 431 (1987).
91. See Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1415; see also International Anti-Bribery and
Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-366, 112 Stat. 3302. The penalties
amounts introduced in 1988 carried over to the 1998 amendments. Id.
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a. Anti-bribery Provisions
i. Changes to the "Knowing or Having Reason to Know" Requirement
Under the original Act, the requisite intent was established if the defendant
company knew or had reason to know that a corrupt act had taken place.
Despite the uneasiness generated by this "reason to know" standard, the
DOJ only prosecuted a limited number of cases under the bribery provi-
sions of the original Act, all of which involved defendants who clearly had
knowledge of the corrupt acts.92 Yet, to clear up the uncertainty created by
the "knowing or having reason to know" standard, Congress eliminated the
phrase "having reason to know" from both the anti-bribery and the
accounting sections. 93 The amended version's standard of knowledge thus
incorporated prohibited acts that involved "actual knowledge" of intended
results. 94 The 1988 Act defined "knowledge" as an awareness of a high
probability of the existence of the circumstance.95 These revisions, which
were retained in the 1998 Act's amendments, 96 thus eliminated the possi-
bility of prosecution absent actual knowledge.
ii. Clarification of "facilitating payments"
An exception existed under the original Act to allow "facilitating payments"
made to foreign officials whose duties were limited to those "essentially
ministerial or clerical." 97 In order to fall within the exemption provision,
companies had to be able to determine whether they were making their
"facilitating" or "grease" payments to a person whose responsibilities
included policy-making. This distinction was especially difficult to make
in countries in which significant language and cultural barriers existed.98
In the 1988 amended Act, Congress retained the exemptions section
but sought to clarify the exemption requirements. The Conference Report
defined "routine governmental action" payments as those made for "ordina-
rily and commonly performed" actions, and expressly excluded from the
exemption any governmental approvals involving an exercise of discretion
by a governmental official where the allegedly corrupt action triggered the
"obtaining or retaining business for or with, or directing business to, any
92. See supra note 80.
93. Senator William Proxmire, one of the authors of the 1977 legislation, vehe-
mently objected to amending the Act, claiming that the members of Congress who
authorized the softening of the anti-bribery law buried it in a king-sized trade bill. See
134 CONG. REc. 8528 (daily ed. June 24, 1988) (statement of Sen. William Proxmire).
94. See H.R. REP. No. 100-576, at 919 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1952.
In the Conference Report, Congress discussed that this standard encompasses the con-
cepts of willful blindness and conscious disregard or deliberate ignorance of known
circumstances that should reasonably alert one to the high probability of violations of
the Act. The requisite "state of mind" for these categories of offenses is that there be a
"conscious purpose to avoid learning the truth." Id.
95. See id.
96. See Pub. L. No. 105-366, 112 Stat. 3302.
97. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(2) (1977).
98. See John E. Impert, A Program for Compliance with the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act and Foreign Law Restrictions on the Use of Sales Agents, 14 INT'L L. 1009, 1015 (1990).
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person."99
The "small facilitation payments" exception has been retained,'but, as
in the OECD Convention (1997), later conventions have attempted to iden-
tify clearly the transactions that fall within this category. 100
iii. Addition of Affirmative Defenses
Congress added two affirmative defenses in an attempt to make it easier for
U.S. businesses to compete abroad. Businesses could, without fear of vio-
lating the FCPA, make payments associated with transactions in previously
questionable areas when the companies could show that the payments
were: "1. Lawful Under the Written Laws and Regulations of the Foreign
Official's Country," or "2. Reasonable and Bona Fide Expenditures." 10 1
These affirmative defenses remain a part of the 1998 FCPA, and also
appear in the OECD Convention, partially modeled after the FCPA. 102
b. Amendments to the Accounting Provisions
In addition to deleting the "reason to know" standard, Congress also clari-
fied the corporation's responsibility to make a "good faith effort" in the
financial record-keeping and internal accounting controls of foreign sub-
sidiaries in which U.S. companies have a minority interest. 10 3 Questions
and criticisms regarding the amount of disclosure required by the "reason-
able detail" and "reasonable assurance" standards on record-keeping and
internal control in the 1977 Act' 0 4 motivated Congress to adopt a "prudent
person" standard for disclosure.' 05 The requirement thus became that
there should be a level of detail and degree of assurance in record-keeping
as would satisfy prudent officials in the conduct of their own affairs. 10 6
c. Requirement that the President Pursue Negotiation of an
International Agreement with the OECD
One of the most significant amendments introduced additional language
that required the President to pursue negotiation of an international agree-
ment to promote international cooperation against bribery among mem-
bers of the OECD. 10 7 The provision expressed the "sense of the Congress
that the President should pursue the negotiation of an international agree-
ment, among the members of the Organization of Economic Cooperation
99. H.R. REP. No. 100-576, at 921.
100. See, e.g., Trade Compliance Center, Commentaries on the Convention on Combat-
ing Bribery of Officials in International Business Transactions (Nov. 21, 1997) <http://
199.88.185.106/tcc/data/commercehtml/TCC_2/OECDConvention/OECDConven
donCommentaries.html>.
101. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(c)(1) (1988).
102. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(c)(2) (1988); OECD Convention, supra note 9.
103. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(6) (1988).
104. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: IMPACT OF FOREIGN
CoRRuPT PRAcTICEs ACT ON U.S. BusINEss (1981). Congress requested this GAO Report
to investigate the impact of the FCPA on U.S. businesses.
105. See S. REP. No. 95-114, at 7 (1997).
106. Id.
107. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78dd-1 (1988).
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and Development, to govern persons from those countries concerning acts
prohibited with respect to issuers and domestic concerns by the amend-
ments made by this section."10 8 The provision required the President to
submit a report to Congress within one year after the date of the enactment
of the Act regarding "the progress of the negotiations." 10 9
When Congress directed the President's efforts toward the OECD, it
targeted major bribe payers that competed with U.S. businesses for con-
tracts. 110 The OECD is comprised of the strongest industrialized nations
in the world, nations accounting for about two-thirds of all global exports
and about ninety percent of all foreign direct investment.1 1 Successful
negotiation of an OECD international convention had the potential to solve
many troublesome competition issues because all of the major competitor
countries would thereafter be working within the same framework of
constraints.
The United States' negotiations with the OECD extended over a num-
ber of years. When the OECD Convention was completed, it included, as a
protective measure and as an inducement to OECD members to ratify the
Convention, a requirement that the Convention not become effective until
ratified by five of the ten largest export-share countries of the OECD and
until at least sixty percent of the combined total exports of OECD coun-
tries were subject to the terms of the Convention. 1 12 This requirement rep-
resented a compromise with Germany and France to address their concern
that all the major trade competitors be subject to the same anti-bribery
restrictions.' 13 France has been slow in passing implementing legislation
pursuant to the OECD Convention, contending that the "anti-bribery cam-
paign is a ploy by U.S. government and U.S. companies to regain competi-
tive advantage." 1 14
The OECD Convention probably could not have succeeded absent
technological changes contributing to globalization and world events giv-
ing strength to the aggressive pursuit of an international agreement. 115
Without these factors, the reaction to the Convention likely would have
been similar to the one elicited by the passage of the 1977 FCPA.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See generally Doggett & Haddad, supra note 14.
111. See U.S. State Dep't, Fact Sheet: OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of For-
eign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (Mar. 1, 2000) <http://
www.state.gov/www/issues/economic/fs 000301_oecdconv.html>.
112. See OECD Convention, supra note 9, art. 15.
113. See Paul Blustein, Pact to Bar Bribery Is Reached; Major Nations Agree to U.S.
Request, WASH. PosT, May 24, 1997, at Fl. France, Germany and others were concerned
that if the Convention entered into force without the "five out of ten largest export
shares" requirement, some of the largest nations might, by holding out, gain a competi-
tive advantage. See OECD Convention, supra note 9, art. 15.
114. Simpson, supra note 13, at A6. The OECD Convention uses a four step process:
1) signing the convention, 2) ratification, 3) effective date of the Convention, which
occurs after meeting the "five of ten largest export shares" requirement, and 4) passage
of implementing legislation by the signatories. Id.
115. See George & Lacey, supra note 1.
Cornell International Law Journal
B. Organization of American States: Inter-American Convention Against
Corruption
A critical triumph for developing nations in North, Central, and South
America was the 1996 adoption of the Inter-American Convention Against
Corruption'1 6 by the Organization of American States (OAS Convention),
a multinational organization comprising thirty-four nations in the Western
Hemisphere." 7 The OAS Convention was the first multilateral convention
to require signatories to criminalize bribery through the implementation of
domestic legislation equivalent to the FCPA. The OAS Convention also
seeks to "prevent, detect, punish and eradicate corruption in the perform-
ance of public functions."" 8 Therefore, the OAS Convention's prohibi-
tions target both the bribe-giver and the bribe-receiver. This prohibition is
broader than that contained within the OECD Convention, which merely
targets the conduct of the bribe-givers.
The OAS Convention also criminalizes illicit enrichment. The Con-
vention defines illicit enrichment as "a significant increase in the assets of
a government official that he cannot reasonably explain in relation to his
lawful earnings during the performance of his functions."1 1 9 Each signa-
tory must establish the offense of illicit enrichment within its own legal
system. °2 0 The United States initially refused to sign the OAS Convention
due to this illicit enrichment provision, which was inserted into the Con-
vention at the last minute.121
The OAS Convention purports to "promote, facilitate and regulate
cooperation among the States Parties to ensure the effectiveness of mea-
sures."1 22 To facilitate cooperation among its members, the OAS Conven-
tion includes provisions authorizing extradition of violators 123 and seizure
of their assets. 124
The OAS Convention emulates the FCPA by requiring deterrents, such
as mechanisms to ensure that publicly held companies maintain books
and records that, in "reasonable detail, accurately reflect the acquisition
and disposition of assets, and have sufficient internal accounting controls
to enable their officers to detect corrupt acts."1 25
In contrast to the penalty provisions in the OECD Convention, which
mandate effective and proportionate penalties for violations, the penalties
116. See OAS Convention, supra note 63.
117. See id. OAS members include: Argentina, the Bahamas, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada,
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suri-
nam, Trinidad and Tobago, United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela. See id.
118. Id. art. II.
119. Id. art. IX.
120. See id.
121. See Bruce Zagaris & Shaila Lakhani Ohri, The Emergence of an International
Enforcement Regime on Transnational Corruption in the Americas, 30 LAw & POL'Y Iwr'L
Bus. 53, 57 (1999).
122. OAS Convention, supra note 63, at art. II.
123. See id. art. XIII.
124. See id. art. XV.
125. Id. art. III.
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for conduct prohibited by the OAS Convention are not clearly specified. 126
Because the OAS Convention penalties are ambiguous, the Convention may
result in less rigorous enforcement and punishment under domestic imple-
menting legislation.
The OAS Convention contains additional measures intended to main-
tain and strengthen prevention. 127 These measures address such concerns
as transparency and accountability in procurement, oversight and regula-
tory measures, ethical standards for public officials, and prohibitions appli-
cable to private sector conduct. 128 Interestingly, the OAS Convention
includes a provision encouraging civil society and NGOs to participate in
efforts to prevent corruption.129
The OAS Convention may be regarded as a bridge from the FCPA to
the OECD Convention.1 30 However, the OAS Convention has inherent
shortcomings that are primarily the result of weaknesses in its ratification
and implementation procedures. The provision allowing signatories to take
reservations to specific provisions in their implementing legislation and
the unwillingness of some members to criminalize corrupt conduct and/or
cooperate with other signatories through extradition contribute to the
problem.131 The OAS ameliorated some of these drawbacks at the Second
Summit of the Americas by deciding to support the OAS Convention by
developing a strategy for its ratification, drafting codes of conduct for pub-
lic officials, holding workshops regarding corruption (an important grass-
roots effort), and engaging in other efforts aimed at eliminating
corruption. 132
In spite of the weaknesses discussed above, the OAS Convention plays
a pivotal role in the fight against corruption because it is composed of a
number of developing nations which have already signed the Convention
into force.133 The participation of those nations indicates a willingness to
resolve the corruption problem within their borders.
C. World Trade Organization
Another multinational organization that has recently begun to mobilize
action against bribery and corruption, specifically in government procure-
ment practices, is the World Trade Organization (WTO). 134 In the wake of
126. See id.
127. See id
128. See id. at art. III; Zagaris & Ohri, supra note 121, at 58-59.
129. See OAS Convention, supra note 63, at art. III.
130. See generally Corr & Lawler, supra note 55.
131. See generally Zagaris & Ohri, supra note 121.
132. See OAS Convention, The OAS After the Santiago Summit (visited Jan. 26, 2001)
<http://www.oas.org/en/pinfo/week/summi2t.htm>.
133. See OAS Convention, supra note 63. Signatories include: Argentina, the Baha-
mas, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecua-
dor, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua,
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Surinam, Trinidad and Tobago, United States, Uruguay, and
Venezuela. See id.
134. See WTO Director General Renato Ruggiero, Address at the Brookings Institution
Forum, "The Global Trading System: A GATT 50th Anniversary Forum" (Mar. 4, 1998).
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World War II, GATT was formed to create an international trade organiza-
tion.135 The WTO is the successor to GATT, and its purpose is to provide a
framework for the regulation of international trade and to supervise mem-
bers' compliance with its policies. 13 6 The WTO is a member-driven, con-
sensus-based organization, rather than an organization operated by an
executive board.137 Its members enforce its rules themselves according to
negotiated procedures. 138
In 1996, the concept behind the WTO celebrated its 50th anniversary
at a meeting commonly referred to as the Uruguay Round.139 At that meet-
ing, the United States raised the issue of targeting corruption in the govern-
ment procurement process and specifically listed the failure to "enforce
anticorruption laws in the government procurement context" as a "trade
barrier in the Uruguay Round Agreements." 140 Consequently, the 1996
WTO Ministerial Declaration' 4 ' included a provision establishing the
Transparency in Government Procurement Working Group to study trans-
parency in government procurement practices. The Working Group issued
a 1999 Report to the General Council on Transparency in Government Pro-
curement (Report) in which it noted all the data and submissions it consid-
ered as part of its study.142 Although the Declaration constituted an initial
step by the WTO toward addressing corruption, the United States Trade
Representative (USTR) formally requested a more aggressive stance, indi-
cating that the WTO should take a leadership role in the campaign against
corruption by adopting anti-bribery measures. 143
The USTR stated that the WTO,144 by virtue of its multilateral mem-
bership base, is in an ideal position to adopt measures banning the receipt
of bribes by public officials and thereby target the demand-side of these
illicit transactions. 145 TI is also pressuring the WTO.146 Additionally, in
135. See WTO, About the WTO (last modified Feb. 9, 1997) <http://www.wto.org/
english/thewto-e/thewto-e.htm>.
136. See id.
137. See id.
138. See id.
139. See Agreement on Government Procurement, General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, Multilateral Trade Negotiations Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay
Round of Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RE sULTS OF THE URU.
GUAY ROUND vol. 1 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994).
140. Corr & Lawler, supra note 55, at 41.
141. See WTO, Singapore Ministerial Declaration (Dec. 13, 1996) (visited Jan. 26,
2001) <http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/minisLe/min96_e/wtodec.htm>.
142. See WTO, Report (1999) to the General Council (Oct. 12, 1999) <http://
www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/grpoc._e/tran99-e.htm>.
143. See WTO, Statement by the Honourable Charlene Barshefsky, Acting United States
Trade Representative (Dec. 9-13, 1996) (visited Jan. 26, 2001) <http://www.wto.org/
english/thewto.e/ministe/min96_e/st5.htm>; Lucinda A. Low & Kathryn C. Atkinson,
Led by the U.S., the World Wages War on Corruption, NAT'L LJ., Mar. 3, 1997, at B14.
144. See Corr & Lawler, supra note 55. The membership of the WTO is broader than
the OECD. Unlike the OECD, the WTO includes many developing countries in addition
to industrialized nations. See id.
145. See id.
146. See Stephen Fidler, WTO Urged to Act on Trade Corruption, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 23,
1998, at 10.
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June 1999, the OECD indicated that it was analyzing how the WTO rules
address corruption and bribery.147 The role of the WTO is critical in
mobilizing developing nations, both at the highest governmental level and
at the grassroots level, to participate actively in the campaign against cor-
ruption. Thus, the WTO should do more to assume a leadership role in the
fight to reduce corruption.
D. United Nations
The December 1996 Declaration Against Corruption and Bribery in Inter-
national Commercial Transactions 148 was incorporated into the U.N. Reso-
lution 149 a few months later. This resolution urges members to criminalize
the payment of bribes to public office holders of other states in interna-
tional commercial transactions and encourages members to establish pro-
grams to deter and prevent bribery and corruption.150
In an attempt to regulate the conduct of bribe-takers, the U.N. General
Assembly adopted on December 12, 1996 an International Code of Con-
duct for Public Officials.' 5 ' It appears that the United Nations has now
adopted measures that target both bribe-givers and bribe-takers in public
positions, although it has not yet adopted any convention with binding
effect.
E. European Union
World-wide attention was focused in early 1999 on the European Union
(EU) due to allegations that the European Commission, the executive body
of the fifteen-nation European Union, engaged in corruption, fraud, and
nepotism.152 The European Parliament voted to appoint a five-member
team to investigate the allegations of corruption. The team's "devastating
report" condemned the commissioners for their "poor or failed administra-
tion, citing several examples of fraud, mismanagement and nepotism."' 53
Noticeably, the report evidenced European concern and attention regard-
ing the issue of corruption. 154 This concern is yet another indication of
current global interest in confronting and eliminating perceived corruption
in both the corporate and political arenas.
147. See generally OECD to Study How WTO Rules Combat Corruption and Bribery,
INSIDE U.S. TRADE, June 18, 1999.
148. United Nations Declaration Against Corruption and Bribery in International Com-
mercial Transactions, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/51/191 (Dec. 16, 1996)
<http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/51/a5lrl91.htm>.
149. See id. (referencing UN Resolution).
150. See id.; see generally Thalif Deen, U.S. Seeks U.N. Declaration Against Bribery,
INTER PRESS SERVICE, July 23, 1996.
151. See United Nations, United Nations International Code of Conduct for Public Offi-
cials (Dec. 12, 1996); see also generally Samia Nakhoul, U.N. Wants Anti-Graft Code for
Officials, REUTERS WoR.D SERVICE, May 1, 1995.
152. See Marion Kerr & Andrew Nagorski, Forced to Walk the Plank, NEwswl, MAR.
29, 1999, at 28-31.
153. Rana Dogar & Amanda Bernard, Will Someone Please Stand Up?, NawswNEK,
MAR. 29, 1999 at 31.
154. See Kerr & Nagorski, supra note 152, at 28-31.
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In recent years, the European Union has devised policy and conducted
communications and conventions focusing on current corruption issues.
On May 21, 1997,the European Commission adopted a Communication to
the Council and to the European Parliament on a Union Policy Against
Corruption.155 The Communication provides Member States with a con-
sistent and coherent policy on corruption in international trade and com-
merce, as well as in other pertinent areas. 156 However, the Communi-
cation does not have the legal effect of a convention.
The European Union's Convention on the Fight Against Corruption
Involving Officials of the European Communities or Officials of Member
States of the European Union (E.U. Convention) was adopted on May 26,
1997.157 The E.U. Convention criminalizes the bribery of E.U. officials as
well as public officials of E.U. member states. However, it does not address
transnational bribery with foreign officials of countries that are not mem-
bers of the European Union.158
In this Convention, the European Parliament changed its prior policy
to address the problem of corruption at the European level, rather than at
the level of the individual states.15 9 As further evidence of this change in
policy, on October 6, 1998, the European Parliament adopted the report of
Rinaldo Bontempi, Italian Member of the European Parliament, on combat-
ing corruption. 160 The report recommends detailed legislation to combat
corruption, targeting such areas as public procurement and accounting
standards.161 Finally, the report recommends that all E.U. members ratify
the E.U. Convention and adopt the OECD Convention. 162
On December 22, 1998, the Council of the European Union adopted
the Joint Action on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European
Union, on corruption in the private sector.163 This joint action states that
"[e]ach Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that
legal persons can be held liable for active corruption"'164 and that "[e]ach
Member State shall, within two years after the entry into force of this Joint
Action, bring forward appropriate proposals to implement this Joint
155. European Union, Communication to the Council and the European Parliament on a
Union Policy Against Corruption (May 21, 1997) <http://europa.eu.int/abc/doc/off/rg/
en/1997/enx80397.htm#1038>.
156. See id.
157. Convention on the Fight Against Corruption Involving Officials of the European
Communities or Officials of Member States of the European Union, May 26, 1997,
OJ.C. 195, 25.6.1997 [hereinafter E.U. Convention].
158. See id.
159. See Transparency Int'l, TI Newsletter, International Organisations, EU Parliament
Adopts Bontempi Report (Dec. 1998) <http://www.transparency.de/documents/newslet-
ter/98.4/intorgan.html>.
160. See id.
161. See id.
162. See id.
163. See European Union, Joint Action of 22 December 1998 Adopted by the Council on
the Basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, on Corruption in the Private
Sector, 1998 OJ. (1358) <http://www.consilium.eu.int/ejn/volb/5-actionscom-
munes/corruption/13909en.html> [hereinafter Joint Action].
164. Id. art. 5.
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Action."165
The European Union has taken a strong, defined position regarding
corruption.166 Its political and economic power permits it to affect policy
in regard to matters such as corruption. The European Union represents
the current global trend in which authority, power, and resources are shift-
ing from the nation-state to supranational regional organizations, 167 and it
thus can wield significant influence within its region to resolve the
problems posed by corruption.
F. Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development
The OECD, whose membership consists of those nations that are the larg-
est exporters of trade and investment in the world, is one of the most
important multilateral organizations and has an annual budget of approxi-
mately U.S. $200 million.' 68 It is a Paris-based organization, founded in
1961169 to "achieve the highest sustainable economic growth and employ-
ment and a rising standard of living in Member countries while maintain-
ing financial stability, and thus to contribute to the development of the
world economy."'170 Later, it also assumed the task of coordinating assis-
tance to developing countries.
The leadership of the OECD has been a critical element in recent years
in the campaign to diminish global corruption; however, "[tihe main
sources in developing countries for significant corrupt payments have been
the big companies in the OECD nations."' 71 A significant amount of the
harm resulting from bribery occurs when multinational corporations from
the more industrialized countries engage in corrupt activities in less devel-
oped countries, frequently in the context of public sector procurement.1 72
The OECD also notes that, "[a]s the largest exporters of trade and invest-
ment in the world, our multinationals represent, by far, the greatest poten-
tial source of bribe money. Given this situation, the supply side was a
165. Id. art. 8.
166. See E.U. Convention, supra note 157; Joint Action, supra note 163; Second Joint
Position of Nov. 13, 1997, defined by the Council on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty On
European Union on Negotiations Held in the Council of Europe and the OECD on the Fight
Against Corruption (97/783/JHA), Oj. Nov. 1, 1997.
167. See Reginald Dale, Euro Brings Need for Accountability, INr'l. HERA.D TRIB.,
March 31, 1998, at 11.
168. See OECD, What is OECD[?] (last modified June 11, 2000) <http://
www.oecd.org/about/general/index.htm>.
169. See Convention on Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,
Dec. 14, 1960 [hereinafter 1960 OECD Convention]. See also ORGANiSATION FOR ECO-
NOMIC COOPERAT7ION AND DEVELOPMENT, OECD: HIsroRy, AIMs, STRuCTURE 13 (1971).
170. 1960 OECD Convention, supra note 169; see OECD, supra note 168, at 5.
171. David Rovella, Anti-Bribery Treaty Set for Signing, NAT'L LJ., Dec. 22, 1997, at B2
(statement by G. Hamilton Loeb, of Los Angeles' Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker
L.L.P.). Note that the OECD countries produce two-thirds of the world's goods and ser-
vices. See id.
172. See Transparency Int'l, The Transparency International Bribe Payers Survey (last
modified May 3, 2000) <http://www.transparency.de/documents/cpi/bps.html>.
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logical place for our countries to start."1 73
To remedy the deleterious effects of corruption, particularly bribery,
in international business transactions, the OECD adopted the Convention
on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions (OECD Convention) on November 21, 1997.174 As the chief
U.S. negotiator of the Convention, Assistant Secretary of State Alan P. Lar-
son stated "thirty-four of the world's largest economies are declaring an
end of an era: it will no longer be business as usual for those who
bribe."175
The formal requirement for entry into force was the ratification by five
of the ten countries which have the largest export shares among the OECD
nations, and which represent at least sixty percent of the combined total
exports of the OECD countries. 176 The OECD Convention's entry into
force occurred in February 1999, when Canada deposited its instrument of
ratification. 17 7
The Commentaries on the Convention on Combating Bribery of Offi-
cials in International Business Transactions, adopted by the Negotiating
Conference on November 21, 1997, state that the Convention "seeks to
assure a functional equivalence among the measures taken by the Parties to
sanction bribery of foreign public officials, without requiring uniformity or
changes in fundamental principles of a Party's legal system.' 178 Thus, the
Convention acknowledges the sovereignty and cultural characteristics of
the individual member nations that become signatories while meeting the
Convention's objective of establishing a multilateral mechanism requiring
consistent legislation criminalizing bribery. 179
Twenty-nine OECD Members 80 and five non-members-Argentina,
Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile and the Slovak Republic-signed the Convention.
With their signatures on December 17, 1997 the participating countries
committed themselves to ratify and implement the OECD Convention as
national legislation by December 31, 1998.181 As of October 5, 2000,
twenty-one nations have adopted implementing legislation, and both the
OECD Working Group on Bribery and the U.S. State Department are moni-
173. OECD Anti-corruption Unit, Frequently Asked Questions (last modified Jan. 18,
2001) <http://www.oecd.org/daf/nocorruption/faq.htm>.
174. OECD Convention, supra note 9.
175. Transparency International, Press Release: Transparency International USA Hails
Implementation of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention (last modified Feb. 9, 2000) <http:/
/www.transparency.de/documents/press-releases/1998/1998.10.27.oecd.html>.
176. See OECD Convention, supra note 9, at art. 15.
177. See U.S. State Dep't, supra note 111.
178. OECD, Commentaries on the Convention on Combating Bribery of Officials in
International Business Transactions (Nov. 21, 1997) <http://www.oecd.org//daf/nocor-
ruption/20nov2e.htm>.
179. See generally Barbara Crutchfield George et al., The 1998 OECD Convention: An
Impetus for Worldwide Changes in Attitudes Toward Corruption in Business Transactions,
37 Am. Bus. LJ. 485 (2000).
180. See supra note 65 for the twenty-nine listed members. See also Ayesha Qayyam,
New Anti-Bribery Treaty Analyzed, INr'L COM. LITIG., Mar., 1998, at 7.
181. See OECD Convention, supra note 9, art.12.
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toring the status of the Convention's implementation. 18 2
The Convention requires signatories to criminalize bribery of foreign
public officials. 18 3 Article I prohibits the intentional offer, promise, or gift
of "any undue pecuniary or other advantage ... to a foreign public offi-
cial.., in order that the official act or refrain from acting in relation to the
performance of official duties, in order to obtain or retain business or other
improper advantage." 18 4 Article III, entitled "Sanctions," sets forth "effec-
tive, proportionate and dissuasive criminal penalties" applicable to those
who bribe foreign public officials.' 8 5
The OECD Convention tackles the issue of corruption in international
business transactions by regulating the conduct of the bribe-givers, the sup-
ply-side of the transaction. The Convention does not resolve the remaining
concerns regarding other damaging aspects of corruption, including the
conduct of bribe-takers. Therefore, to fully address the remaining issues, it
is necessary to implement a multi-faceted strategy which includes the
OECD, its member nations, and grassroots efforts initiated in the develop-
ing countries in which the bribe-takers reside.
G. FCPA Amendments in the 1998 Implementation of the OECD
Agreement
In compliance with the requirements of the OECD Convention, the U.S.
Congress amended the FCPA on November 10, 1998 by adopting the Inter-
national Anti-bribery and Fair Competition Act (International Anti-Bribery
Act).186 With extensive existing legislation, Congress easily set about the
task of making a few necessary additions to the 1988 FCPA Act.' 8 7
1. Anti-bribery Amendments
The 1998 Act makes it unlawful for any person' 8 (either an issuer or a
182. See OECD, Country Reports on the Implementation of the Convention on Combat-
ing Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions and the 1997
Revised Recommendation (June 27, 2000) <http://www.oecd.org/daf/nocorruption/
index.htm>; U.S. State Dep't, supra note 111. The 21 nations are: Australia, Austria,
Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
Iceland, Japan, Korea, Norway, the U.K., United States, Mexico, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden
and Turkey. See id.
183. See OECD Convention, supra note 9, art.1.
184. Id. The language in initial drafts only referred to illicit payments for the purpose
of obtaining business, but, upon further review, the OECD altered tjhe language to
include payments for any "other improper advantage." Id.
185. OECD Convention, supra note 9, art. 3.
186. Pub. L. No. 105-366, 112 Stat. 3302 (1998).
187. Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1415 (1988). The relevant sections that represent
a departure from the 1988 amendments are discussed below, and major changes in
terms or interpretation are italicized for emphasis and clarity.
188. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a)(2) (1998). The term "person" refers to any natural
person other than a national of the United States, any corporation, partnership, associa-
tion, joint stock company, business trust, unincorporated organization, or sole proprie-
tor organized under the law of a foreign nation or a political subdivision thereof. The
1998 Act fills in the gaps regarding the liability for a foreign national, person, or entity
knowingly assisting a U.S. person or entity. A foreign incorporated subsidiary is
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domestic concern) knowingly1 8 9 to make use of the mails or any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce corruptly in furtherance of an
offer, payment, promise to pay, or authorization of the payment of any
money, or offer, gift, promise to give, or authorization of the giving of any-
thing of value to
(A)(1) any foreign official
(2) any foreign political party or official thereof or any candidate for for-
eign political office for the purpose of
(i) influencing any act or decision of such party, official, or candi-
date in its or his official capacity,
(ii) inducing such party, official or candidate to do or omit to do an
act in violation of the lawful duty of such party, official, or candi-
date, or
(iii) securing any improper advantage; or
(B) inducing such party, official or candidate to use its or his influence with
a foreign government or instrumentality thereof to affect or influence any act
or decision of such government or instrumentality, in order to assist such
issuer in obtaining or retaining business for or with, or directing business to,
any person. 190
The Act still permits facilitating, or "grease," payments to expedite or
secure the performance of routine government functions. However, it fur-
ther clarifies the parameters of these kinds of payments. For example,
"grease" payments are permissible for obtaining licenses, permits, visas,
and processing work orders. 19 1
In sum, the 1998 Act criminalizes the act of any U.S. person, issuer, or
domestic concern who knowingly offers anything of value, either directly
or through an intermediary, to a foreign official, broadly defined, in
exchange for an improper advantage in obtaining or retaining business
contracts.
2. Anti-bribery Penalties
The relative weakness of penalties and enforcement standards in other
countries that have implemented the OECD Convention is a concern for
those who are observing the effect of the Convention on the reduction of
business corruption. For instance, Japan has been criticized for its inade-
exempt, but a U.S. parent corporation can be liable for knowingly participating in the
payments made by the foreign subsidiary. See id.
189. See id. The Act specifically prohibits payments made directly to a foreign govern-
ment official as well as payments made to an intermediary while "knowing' that it will
be passed on to an official. "Knowledge" is being aware of the high probability that the
payment will be made coupled with a conscious disregard of that probability. U.S.C.
§ 15 78dd-1 (1998).
190. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a)-(b) (1998) (emphasis added). The definition of "foreign
public official" has been amended to include officials of "public international organiza-
tions." 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(a)(2). This definition is intended to include officials of such
organizations as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. See id. One can
interpret the "securing any improper advantage" provision as a ban on payments, trans-
actional or otherwise, to foreign officials for any reason, including money paid to secure
the release of a hostage. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(a)(2)(iii).
191. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(4) (1977).
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quate penalty structure, which limits jail time to three years and fines to
$20,000 for individuals and $2 million for corporations. 192 As another
example of inadequate enforcement standards, Great Britain has three
laws, each passed nearly a century ago, that it claims satisfy the standards
set by the OECD convention even though the laws have yet to result in a
single conviction.193 Similar concerns with other countries have motivated
critics, such as attorney James Weinstein, to comment that "we'd like to
start seeing some [OECD] prosecutions during the next 24 months ....
[I]f there are no prosecutions in the next two or three years, it'll lose its
edge."194
The United States retained the stringent penalty structure established
in the 1988 Act. 195 Any domestic concern that violates the anti-bribery
section of the Act is subject to a criminal penalty of not more than $2 mil-
lion and a civil penalty of not more than $10,000.196 Any officer, director,
or U.S. citizen, national or resident, who is an employee or agent of a
domestic concern, or stockholder acting on behalf of such domestic con-
cern, shall be fined not more than $100,000 or imprisoned not more than
five years, or both.197 The civil penalty for the same class of individuals is
not more than $10,000.198
3. Accounting Provisions
The requirements on publicly-held U.S. corporations are essentially the
same as those set forth in the 1988 Act:
(A) make and keep books, records, and accounts, which, in reasonable
detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the
assets of the issuer; and
(B) devise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls sufficient
to provide reasonable assurances that
(i) transactions are executed in accordance with management's . . .
authorization;
(ii) transactions are recorded.., in conformity with generally accepted
accounting principles;
(iii) access to assets is permitted only in accordance with manage-
ment's... authorization; and
(iv) the recorded accountability for assets is compared with the existing
assets at reasonable intervals and appropriate action is taken with
respect to any differences. 19 9
To date, the SEC has not placed direct emphasis on enforcing sanctions for
violations of these provisions. It has used the FCPA only as an additional
192. See Simpson, supra note 13.
193. See Doggett & Haddad, supra note 14.
194. Id. at C2. Martin J. Weinstein is a former federal prosecutor and partner in the
Washington law firm of Foley & Lardner. See id.
195. See 15 U.S.C. § 78 dd-2(g)(1)(A),(B) (1988).
196. See id.
197. See id.
198. See id. § 78 dd-2(g)(1)(B), (2)(B), § 78dd-2(g)(2)(A).
199. Id. § 78m(b)(2).
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theory when proceeding against a person or entity on violations of other
sections of the securities laws.
4. Accounting Penalties
The penalties for accounting violations include the following: (1) a penalty
that equals the greater of $5000 for a natural person or $50,000 for any
other person, or the gross amount of pecuniary gain realized by a defen-
dant as a result of the violation;20 0 (2) these maximum penalties increase
to $50,000 for a natural person or $250,000 for any other person if the
violations involve fraud, deceit, manipulation, or deliberate or reckless dis-
regard of a regulatory requirement;20 1 and (3) the maximum penalties fur-
ther increase to $100,000 for a natural person and to $500,000 for any
other person if, in addition to the fraud and other acts of malfeasance
listed in (2) above, the violation also directly or indirectly results in sub-
stantial losses or creates a significant risk of substantial losses to other
persons.202
H. Council of Europe
Another example of a regional anti-corruption initiative is the Council of
Europe's (Council's) Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, which
criminalizes bribes paid to public officials and private parties, as well as a
wide range of other criminal offenses connected with corruption.20 3 Other
offenses include corruption of office-holders in international organiza-
tions, members of national and foreign parliaments, judges and interna-
tional office-holders of international courts of justice, and deriving
advantages from unprofessional conduct and the laundering of profits
gained from bribery.20 4 The Council's Convention tackles the issue of cor-
ruption very broadly, and it has a detailed monitoring procedure to report
on the progress made by the twenty-seven signatories in implementing its
provisions. 20 5 The Council of Europe has become a leader in international
efforts to fight corruption and works cooperatively with the OECD's Work-
ing Group on Bribery in International Business Transactions.
20 6
The Council of Europe's own Working Group has completed work on
a Civil Convention on Corruption, which would allow parties allegedly
injured by acts of corruption to sue for damages.20 7 The Council of
200. See id. § 78u(d)(3)(B)(i).
201. See id. § 78u(d)(3)(B)(ii).
202. See id. § 78u(d)(3)(B)(iii).
203. See id. Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, Jan. 27, 1999, Strasbourg,
Europ. T.S. No. 173; see also Briefing by Undersecretary of State, Stuart Eizenstat, and
Undersecretary of Commerce, David Aaron, The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention FEDERAL
NEwS SERvIcE, June 30, 1999 [hereinafter Briefing].
204. See Transparency Int'l, TI Newsletter, International Organisations: Council of
Europe Asked to Sharpen Convention (Dec. 1998) <http://www.transparency.de/docu-
ments/newsletter/98.4/intorgan.html>.
205. See id.
206. See id.
207. See Civil law Convention on Corruption, Nov. 4, 1999, Europ. T.S. No. 74 [here-
inafter Civil Law Convention on Corruption].
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Europe's Committee adopted the Civil Law Convention on November 4,
1999.208 The Council of Europe can provide valuable assistance in dimin-
ishing corruption in its region by assessing the necessary changes at the
regional, national, and local levels, and by monitoring the implementation
and enforcement of its conventions.
111. Anti-Corruption Guidelines Utilized by International Financial
Institutions/Multilateral Development Banks
Public sector procurement often is significantly funded by multilateral
development banks such as the World Bank and the IMF. 20 9 According to
Peter Eigen of TI, "[blillions of dollars are misappropriated each year in the
process of public sector contracting." 210 Media attention and public con-
cern flowing from this misappropriation of funds has caused the World
Bank and the IMF to become increasingly vocal'about their decisions to
deny loans to countries that are unable or unwilling to rid themselves of
bribery, kickbacks, and political payoffs.2
11
A. World Bank
The Bank-with its divisions, the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (IBRD) and the International Development Agency
(IDA)-was created to "assist in reconstruction after World War II. Recon-
struction has remained an important focus of the Bank's work, given the
increasing number of natural disasters, complex humanitarian emergen-
cies, and postconflict rehabilitation needs that have characterized the
developing and transition economies." 212 The Bank stimulates productive
investment in developing countries by lending capital to the countries for
infrastructure projects,213 financing banking and corporate reform, and
engaging in other projects intended to provide a social cushion to the poor
and unemployed in transition economy nations.214 In addition, the Bank
is a key player in the battle against corruption in the public procurement
process within developing nations.215
The Bank, through a number of mechanisms, has recently intensified
its focus on preventing corruption. In 1997, the Bank published a report
evaluating its role in combating corruption, stating that while it cannot
formally take "a coercive stance," it can lawfully withhold aid or other
208. See id.
209. See Transparency Int'l, Islands of Integrity: The Integrity Pact (visited Jan. 26,
2000) <http://vwvw.transparency.de/activities/ip-attachm-a.html-". "'Public sector' in
this context includes national and provincial governments . . . as well as parastatals
(state owned corporations) and other organizations carrying out public functions." Id.
210. Eigen Address, supra note 2.
211. See id.
212. World Bank, About the World Bank Group, History (visitedJan. 29, 2001) <http://
www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/about/history.htm>.
213. See id.
214. See World Bank, Helping Countries Reduce Corruption (visited Jan. 29, 2001)
<ww 1.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/helping.htm>.
215. See id.
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funding to countries that have not adequately addressed corruption.216
The World Bank Institute (WBI), as part of the World Bank Group,
"facilitates action-oriented and participatory programs to promote good
governance and curb corruption in client countries."217 To combat cor-
ruption in client countries, the WBI cooperates with other World Bank
Group entities, outside organizations, and stakeholders within client coun-
tries to conduct diagnostic surveys and organize coalitions.218
In May 1998, the World Bank created the Oversight Committee on
Fraud and Corruption to review allegations of corruption by any mem-
ber.2 19 Through the Economic Development Institute, the World Bank con-
ducts Integrity Workshops and procurement seminars.220 In October
1998, the World Bank established a telephone hotline to facilitate the
reporting of fraud and corruption.221 The Bank also conducts ongoing
research to diagnose the extent and character of corruption in a given
country. 222
The Bank has been mindful of corruption within its own organization
too. Accordingly, it authorized independent audits of fifty-four of its own
projects in the last two years.223 The audit revealed that the Bank had been
involved in "misprocurement on about 40 contracts with a total contract
value of $ 40 million."224
In part due to the findings of the audit, the Bank has strengthened its
anti-corruption stance by banning firms that offer bribes from participat-
ing in future Bank-financed procurement projects. In addition, it maintains
the right to cancel loans to governments whose officials solicited bribes
and require borrowing countries and their contractors to comply with anti-
corruption guidelines as a prerequisite to aid.225
The guidelines provide that, upon discovery of fraudulent or corrupt con-
duct by a bidder or, once financing has been granted, by a borrower, the
bank will reject the bidder's proposals for awards, cancel the remaining por-
tions of loans.., and debar the borrower from future World Bank financing
for a stated period of time or indefinitely.226
216. See World Bank, Preventing Corruption in Bank Projects (visited Jan. 29, 2001)
<http://wwwl.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/prevent.htm>.
217. World Bank, World Bank Institute, Governance and Anti-Corruption, Overview &
Strategy (visited Jan. 29, 2001) <http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/
overview.htm>
218. See id.
219. See World Bank, supra note 216.
220. See id.
221. See World Bank (visitedJanuary 29, 2001) <http://www1.worldbank.org/public-
sector/prevent.htm>.
222. See World Bank, supra note 214.
223. See id.
224. Id.
225. See George & Lacey, supra note 1, at 34; Low & Atkinson, supra note 143, at B9.
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Thus, if a bidder is found to have engaged in corrupt behavior, the Bank
can bar it from future bids; and if a borrower has engaged in corruption,
the remaining portions of the loan may be cancelled. The development of
guidelines calling for specific economic and financial consequences when
corruption is detected reflects the growing reluctance of international
agencies to provide capital to nations riddled with corruption. The guide-
lines also evidence the agencies' efforts to reduce corruption in the pro-
curement process of emerging countries.
B. International Monetary Fund
The IMF was officially established when twenty-nine countries signed its
Articles of Agreement on December 27, 1945.227 The IMF was created to
"promote international monetary cooperation; to facilitate the expansion
and balanced growth of international trade; to promote exchange stability;
to assist in the establishment of a multilateral system of payments; to make
its general resources temporarily available to its members experiencing bal-
ance of payments difficulties under adequate safeguards;"2 28 and to con-
sult and collaborate on international monetary problems generally. 22 9 The
IMF presently has 182 member nations, representing all regions of the
globe.2 30 It is headquartered in Washington D.C. and boasts a staff of over
2600 individuals drawn from 122 different countries.23 1
Surveillance is one mechanism employed by the IMF to promote inter-
national exchange rate stability.23 2 The IMF's surveillance activities have
prompted some commentators to characterize the IMF as a "global watch-
dog," suitably positioned to determine when and where a financial crisis
may occur.23 3 If necessary, the IMF can infuse capital into troubled econo-
mies, thereby acting as a catalyst to restore private sector confidence in the
system and attract investment to the economy. 234
As a creditor, the IMF has the power to attach certain conditions to the
money that it provides; for instance, it may insist that an applicant adopt
institutional reform measures intended to eliminate corrupt practices
which undermine economic stability.235 Thus, the IMF possesses signifi-
cant leverage to require that developing nations reduce internal
227. See International Monetary Fund, The IMF at a Glance (last modified Jan. 2001)
<http:///www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/glance.htm>.
228. Id.
229. See Tom Petruno, The Financial "White Knight": IMF Demystified, L.A. TMES, Nov.
22, 1997, at Al.
230. See International Monetary Fund, About the IMF (January 26, 2001) <http://
www.imf.org/external/about.htm>.
231. See International Monetary Fund, supra note 227.
232. See id.
233. See id.
234. See id.
235. See International Monetary Fund, IMF Adopts Guidelines Regarding Governance
Issues (Aug. 4, 1997) <http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/nb/1997/NB9715.htm>
[hereinafter Guidelines].
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corruption. 236
In August 1997 the IMF adopted stringent guidelines to promote pub-
lic sector transparency and accountability. These guidelines were adopted
to improve efficiency and support sustained economic growth.2 37 Accord-
ing to the guidelines, the IMF has adopted a "more proactive approach in
advocating policies" and actively pursues "the development of institutions
and administrative systems that aim to eliminate the opportunity for cor-
ruption [and] fraudulent activity in the management of public
resources."23 8 The IMF's aims to achieve "an evenhanded treatment of gov-
ernance issues in all member countries," "enhanced collaboration with
other multilateral institutions, in particular the World Bank" and an
improved "use of complementary areas of expertise [among anti-corrup-
tion initiatives]." 23 9
The IMF has been involved in several well-publicized bailouts in the
last few years, including those occurring in Mexico, Thailand, South Korea,
and Indonesia. 240 These bailouts not only focused global attention on the
continued existence of corruption but also demonstrated the potential
influence of the IMF in "promoting good governance in all its aspects....
improving the efficiency and accountability of the public sector, and tack-
ling corruption." 24 1
IV. Transparency International, The Leading Non-governmental
Institution in the Fight Against Corruption
A. Background and Achievements
The three necessary components to confront corruption successfully are:
(1) the implementation of multilateral conventions targeting corruption;
(2) the efforts of international financial institutions; and (3) grassroots
efforts within civil society to overcome cultural attitudes that support brib-
ery and corruption. The first two components have been addressed above;
the third is discussed below.
Since its inception in Berlin in 1993, TI has experienced a rapid rise in
stature to its present position as the preeminent NGO combating corrup-
tion worldwide.24 2 It is the only international NGO exclusively devoted to
curbing corruption, and it views itself as seeking "to empower civil society
236. See id. The IMF funding pool is the sum of subscriptions by the IMF's 182 mem-
ber nations, which essentially keep a share of their national currencies on deposit with
the IMF. The IMF deals only with a recipient country's central bank, feeding money
directly into that institution and thus bolstering the financial reserves ultimately back-
ing the government. See Petruno, supra note 229, at Al.
237. See generally supra'note 236.
238. Guidelines, supra note 235.
239. Id.
240. See Paul Blustein, Hard Part Begins for Seoul and the IMF, INT'L HERALD TmB., Nov.
24, 1997, at 1; Evelyn Iritani, Pacific Blues, L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 22, 1997, at Dl.
241. Guidelines, supra note 235.
242. See Transparency Int'l, Ti's Structure (last modified Jun. 23, 2000) <http://
www.transparency.de/organisation/index.html>.
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to play a meaningful role in countering corruption."243 TI operates at the
grassroots level to empower "civil society"2 44 within target countries.245
Thus, TI signifies a collaboration of non-governmental forces, unified in
their efforts against corrupt practices.
TI is based on the conviction that "corruption impacts negatively not
only on human rights and economic development, but also undermines
stability and can threaten peace and security."246 Accordingly, TI has
identified four primary areas of damage caused by bribery and corruption:
(1) humanitarian-that "corruption undermines and distorts development
and leads to increasing levels of human rights abuse;" (2) democratic-that
"corruption undermines democracies and in particular the achievements
of many developing countries and countries in transition;" (3) ethical-that
"corruption undermines a society's integrity;" and (4) practical-that "cor-
ruption distorts the operations of markets and deprives ordinary people of
the benefits which should flow from them."247 These policy statements
make it clear that TI's anticorruption efforts are broad-based.
TI emphasizes prevention and systematic reform "[i]nstead of attempt-
ing to expose individual examples of corruption."248 To accomplish its
goals, TI targets not only government officials who accept bribes, but also
the businesses that offer bribes. TI thus pursues a reduction in corrupt
practices by parties on both sides of a given corrupt transaction, and views
such demand and supply-side targeting as critical to an effective anti-cor-
ruption campaign.
TI gathers data regarding the perceived extent of corruption, develops
systems to combat corruption, engages various multinational organizations
to encourage the passage of conventions aimed at eliminating corruption,
and organizes conferences for the exchange of information about current
levels of corruption world-wide. 249 In sum, "TI builds national, regional
and global coalitions, embracing the state, civil society and the private sec-
tor, in order to fight domestic and international corruption." 250 TI's for-
mation of coalitions is a critical step towards eradicating corruption.
243. Transparency Int'l, Mission Statement (last modified Feb. 9, 2000) <http://
www.transparency.de/mission.html>.
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those arrangements within it, that exist outside the state's reach or instigation." Rieff,
supra note 10, at 11.
245. See Eigen Address, supra note 2.
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eral Meeting of Transparency International (TI) [at] Kuala Lumpur 16, September 1998
(last modified February 9, 2000) <http://www.trasparency.de/documents/press-
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247. Transparency Int'l, Welcome (last modified Apr. 10, 2000) <http://
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1. New Bribe Payers Index
In 1999 TI developed, with the assistance of Gallup International Associa-
tion, a Bribery Index of Leading Exporting Nations (BPI), which measures
the sources of international corruption.25 1 During the data collection
phase, more than 770 executives at major corporations, chambers of com-
merce, commercial banks, and law firms in fourteen emerging-market
nations answered detailed questionnaires about their perceptions of which
countries are home to multinational corporations that are paying
bribes. 252 In the BPI, TI and Gallup selected those emerging markets
"where there is a reasonable spread of international competition" and diffi-
culties with bribery in international business transactions. 253
The BPI ranks exporting nations on a one to ten scale, where ten repre-
sents a very low perceived level of bribery, and one indicates a very high
level of bribery.2 54 Sweden had the best score, 8.3.255 It is interesting to
note that despite a two-decade history since the adoption of the FCPA, 25 6
the United States had a score of 6.2 in the 1999 BPI. 257
"The scale of bribe-paying by international corporations in the devel-
oping countries of the world is massive. Actions by the majority of govern-
ments of the leading industrial countries to curb international corruption
are modest."25 8 Dr. Peter Eigen has stated,
the press focuses on the developing countries of the world when reporting
on the CPI because corruption is perceived to be greatest there, but I urge
the public to recognise that a large share of the corruption is the explicit
product of multinational corporations, headquartered in leading industrial-
ised countries, using massive bribery and kick-backs to buy contracts in the
developing world and the countries in transition.25 9
As TI points out, the purpose of the BPI is to raise public awareness about
the "supply-side" of bribery transactions. 2 60 In subsequent years, it plans
to measure perception to see if the OECD Convention, and the domestic
legislation implementing it in OECD nations, has an effect on the perceived
251. Transparency Int'l, supra note 61.
252. See Transparency Int'l, Questions and Answers on the 1999 TI Corruption Percep-
tions Index (CPI) [and] the 1999 Bribe-Payer's Index (BPI) (last modified Jul. 3, 2000)
<http://www.transparency.de/documents/cpi/cpi-q-and-a.html>. The fourteen coun-
tries that responded to the poll were India, Indonesia, Philippines, South Korea, Thai-
land, Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Hungary, Poland, Russian Federation, Morocco,
Nigeria, and South Africa. See id.
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256. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b), 78dd-1, 78dd-2 (1988).
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258. Transparency Int'l, The TI Bribe Payers Survey, (last modified May 3, 2000)
<http://www.transparency.de/documents/cpi/bps.html>.
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Corruption Perceptions Index (July 31, 1997) <http://www.transparency.de/documeftts/
press-releases/1997/1997.31.7.cpi.html>.
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extent of bribery.261
2. Corruption Perception Index
For the last five years one of TI's most widely publicized activities has been
its annual survey ranking countries based on their perceived level of bribe-
taking, the TI Corruption Perception Index (CPI). 2 62 The Index is pub-
lished in cooperation with the University of Ggttingen by Johann Graf
Lambsdorff and has become an internationally acknowledged instrument
for measuring corrupt practices, as perceived by business people. The CPI
ranks countries by the degree to which they are perceived to be home to
bribe-takers, and thus it is an attempt to measure the demand side of brib-
ery transactions. 263
Dr. Eigen, Chairman of TI, characterizes the CPI as "a measure of lost
development opportunities" that establishes an empirical link "between the
level of corruption and foreign direct investment."264 Because such data
are important to multilateral lending institutions, nations seeking interna-
tional investment and funding from entities such as the World Bank and
the IMF are compelled to analyze the CPI data carefully and attempt to
correct any revealed problems of corruption within their own countries.
Publication of the 1999 CPI attracted media attention all over the
globe. TI held simultaneous press conferences at their headquarters in
Berlin and in Washington D.C.2 65 Ninety-nine countries were included in
the 1999 Corruption Perception Index, an increase from the eighty-five
included in the 1998 survey.266 TI observed that
[a]fter some controversy over the fairness of the index to developing coun-
tries-and to Latin America in particular-it was interesting to see the fairness
with which the media reported and to note that the constructive message
behind the CPI was well understood by the Latin American media: corrup-
tion needs to be taken seriously.2 6 7
The 1999 CPI is a "poll of polls," and has a different methodology
261. See id.
262. See Transparency Int'l, 1999 Corruption Perceptions Index (last modified Aug. 23,
2000) <http://www.transparency.de/documents/cpi/index.html>. The Index draws on
surveys undertaken by Gallup International, the World Competitiveness Yearbook, by
Political and Economic Risk Consultancy in Hong Kong, DRI/McGraw Hill Global Risk
Service, Political Risk Services in Syracuse, NY, among other sources.
263. See Transparency Int'l, Press Release: New Poll Shows Many Leading Exporters
Using Bribes (Oct. 26, 1999) <http://www.transparency.de/documents/cpi/cpi-bpi_
press-release.html>.
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265. See Transparency Int'l, TI Newsletter, Special Feature, The 1999 Corruption Percep-
tions Index and the New Bribe Payers Index (1999) available at <http://
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266. See Transparency Int'l, Questions & Answers (last modified Jul. 3, 2000) <http://
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than the BPI.2 68 In the 1999 poll, Denmark retained the highest CPI score,
a virtually corrupt-free score of 10.269 The country perceived as the worst
in terms of corruption was Cameroon, with a score of 1.5, drawn from four
surveys. 270 The United States, despite the twenty-two year history of the
FCPA,27 1 has a CPI score of only 7.5.272
Seemingly out of fairness to less-developed nations, TI maintains that
it is more important to evaluate an individual country's score as compared
to the ten-point maximum rather than to focus exclusively on the ranking
of a given country relative to other countries. 27 3 Peter Eigen stated in
regard to the 1999 CPI that "[algain this year we are seeing many very poor
countries in the lowest positions on the CPI. We would caution that it
would be wrong to call these countries the most corrupt in the world."'2 74
He stressed that "[glovernments of countries with low CPI scores need to
do far more to publicly acknowledge the problems, to confront the issues,
to subject the corrupt companies and the corrupt officials to prosecution
and to earn public confidence by their anti-bribery policies."2
75
TI reports that the CPI has had a positive impact on the national polit-
ics of various countries and has helped to shape public awareness and con-
cern regarding corruption.2 76 "We know that publication of the CPI has
contributed to raising public awareness of the cancer of corruption," notes
Eigen.27 7 "While some governments rejected the implicit criticism out of
hand, others have acted on it, initiating reforms to strengthen their integ-
rity systems."278 Dr. Eigen specifically mentioned Malaysia as one such
example. 27 9
TI has reviewed and revised certain aspects of the CPI based on its
own insights and the response of some developing nations.28 0 These devel-
oping nations perceive a bias in the CPI against their countries. In other
words, while the CPI reflects that developing nations often are the sites of
268. See id. The Index draws on surveys undertaken by Gallup International, the
World Competitiveness Yearbook, Political and Economic Risk Consultancy in Hong
Kong, DRI/McGraw Hill Global Risk Service, Political Risk Services in Syracuse, NY,
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reports discussing the methodology of both indices and reviews the methodology
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public official bribe-takers,281 the CPI does not reflect that the private sec-
tor bribe-givers frequently reside in the more industrialized nations.282
The concerns expressed by the developing nations regarding the one-sided
focus of the CPI were instrumental in TI developing the Bribe Payers Index.
The TI Year 2000 CPI was released on September 13, 2000.283 The
2000 CPI is a composite index, drawing on sixteen surveys from eight inde-
pendent institutions.284 It is based on surveys conducted over the 1998-
2000 period.285 TI maintains that "[t]his multi-year approach is more
accurate and realistic."286
The CPI indices are instrumental in raising worldwide awareness of
corrupt business practices. However, perhaps the most important contri-
bution TI can make to the struggle to eradicate corruption is to continue
influencing cultural attitudes regarding corruption through a variety of
grassroots initiatives, such as their National Chapters and Integrity
Pacts. 2 8 7
B. Anti-Corruption Efforts in Developing Nations & Elsewhere
1. TI National Chapters
TI maintains that its coordination and support of its National Chapters in
individual countries is necessary to bring the battle against corruption to
the grassroots level.28 8 Currently over seventy-seven TI National Chapters
work actively within their home countries to design national anti-corrup-
tion strategies.289 These chapters operate independently of government,
business and partisan political interests.290
TI, through its National Chapters, is able to carry the fight against
corruption to the grassroots level by organizing and sponsoring Integrity
Workshops, National Anti-Corruption Days, cartoon and essay competi-
tions,-and radio "phone-in" and other whistleblowing projects for the
reporting of corrupt practices.291 The National Chapters engage in other
activities, such as monitoring privatization initiatives and political cam-
281. Transparency Int'l, TI Newsletter, The 3rd Page, TI Annual General Meeting Kuala
Lumpur, September 1998 (Dec. 1998) <http://www.transparency.de/documents/news-
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284. See id.
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286. Id. (statement made by TI Executive Director Jeremy Pope).
287. See Transparency Int'l, Programmes and Activities (last modified Jan. 15, 2001)
<http://www.transpatency.de/activities/index.html>.
288. See Transparency Int'l, National Chapters and Contacts (last modified Jan. 5,
2001) <http://www.transparency.de/organisation/chapters/>.
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291. See Transparency Int'l, National Chapter Activities (last modified Feb. 9, 2000)
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paign funding, overseeing public hearings on major construction projects,
and developing educational tools regarding corruption.29 2 Additionally,
the Chapters are instrumental in implementing TI's Integrity Pact program,
helping to ensure integrity and transparency in government and public
procurement projects by arranging Integrity Pledges for public officials and
providing guidance throughout the Integrity Pact process. 293
TI is convinced that anti-corruption efforts are sustainable only "with
the involvement of all the stakeholders[, including] ... the state, civil soci-
ety and the private sector."29 4 TI's aim thus is to achieve cooperation
among diverse non-governmental entities. It focuses its energies upon the
formation of coalitions, including the construction of information-sharing
systems. Finally, TI strives to operate in a non-confrontational way, and,
accordingly, it does not "name names" or publicize individual cases of
corruption.2 95
A critical step in TI's effort to mobilize all relevant stakeholders is the
establishment of National Chapters.29 6 Although TI currently has
National Chapters in over seventy countries worldwide, with 263 chapters
in nations such as South Korea, Cambodia, Malaysia, Russia, Bolivia, Gua-
temala,29 7 and Kenya,29 8 TI has not yet been successful in establishing
chapters in certain major countries. For example, Japan currently has only
a national contact. 29 9
2. Integrity Pacts
TI's Integrity Pacts (IPs) 30 0 are an important part of its grassroots-level
initiative.30 1 An IP results when a national government and bidding com-
panies mutually promise not to engage in corrupt public procurement
practices; bidding companies publicly pledge not to use bribes, while gov-
ernment agencies pledge total transparency on the part of its officials in
awarding the contract. 30 2 The IP is designed to ensure the absence of cor-
ruption in the handling of selected contracts with International Financing
292. See id. *
293. Id.; Transparency Int'l, The Integrity Pact (TI-IP): The Concept, the Model and the
Present Applications, A Status Report as of December 8, 2000 (last modified Jan. 12, 2001)
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Institutions and selected external donor-financed projects.30 3
According to TI's concept paper, the IP is intended to accomplish two
objectives:
(a) to enable companies to abstain from bribing by providing assur-
ances to them that (i) their competitors will also refrain from bribing, and
(ii) government procurement agencies will undertake to prevent corruption,
including extortion, by their officials and to follow transparent procedures;
and
(b) to enable governments to reduce the high cost and the distortionary
impact of corruption on public procurement.30 4
The IP concept is recommended also for privatization programs, for licens-
ing procedures in telecommunications, transport, mining, and logging.30 5
Consulting bids can be handled accordingly. 306
The main features of the Integrity Pact are:
a formal no-bribery commitment by the bidder, as part of the signed tender
document; a corresponding commitment of the government to prevent extor-
tion and the acceptance of bribes by its officials; disclosure of all payments
to agents and other third parties; sanctions against bidders who violate their
no-bribery commitment; involvement of Civil Society in monitoring the bid
evaluation; and public disclosure of the award decision alternatively to the
involvement of Civil Society or preferably in addition to it.
30 7
TI recommends that the respective bidders be notified of the IP concept as
early in the bidding process as possible.308 In addition, as part of the pre-
qualification procedures, bidders should be required to certify their com-
mitment to the IP concept to show that they qualify to submit a bid.30 9 To
assist in the implementation of its IP program, TI drafted a model "Invita-
tion to Tender for Public Sector Procurement" as well as a "Model Commu-
nication by the Government of XYZ to all Bidders invited to Tender for the
YYY Project."3 10
TI must educate nations regarding its IP program and assist national
efforts to implement the IPs. One example of a failed attempt to implement
an IP-like program involved a coalition of African nations obtaining con-
struction funds from the World Bank. In 1998, the Chairman for Global
Coalition for Africa, Robert McNamara, and the Executive Secretary of the
Global Coalition of Africa, Ould Abdallah, received a commitment from the
governments of seven African states-Benin, Malawi, Ethiopia, Tanzania,
Mali, Mozambique and Uganda-to participate in an IP.31 1 The states sub-
mitted a written request to the World Bank that future construction
303. See id.
304. Id.
305. See id.
306. See id.
307. Id.
308. See id.
309. See id.
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projects be subject to the IP.312 However, "[tlhe Bank decided that the IP
had a chance to succeed only if a number of minimum conditions regard-
ing governance in the country were fulfilled [and] . .. [unfortunately, the
IP has not been introduced into any Bank-financed activities in those coun-
tries."313 These states' failed attempt to initiate a successful IP program
underscores the importance of TI's role as educator, facilitator, and over-
seer of anti-corruption measures in public sector procurement.
Examples of the successful implementation of IP initiatives are
presented by the refinery rehabilitation project in Ecuador and the priva-
tization of telecommunication in Panama.314 In Argentina, a limited Integ-
rity Pact to build a new line in the Argentinian metro system is currently in
the negotiation stage.3 15
TI has taken critical first steps to curb corruption in public sector pro-
curement of goods and services. While "[miany governments and business
leaders have recognized the high risk arid cost of bribery and extortion and
[now] seek ways to curb and eventually eliminate corruption in such trans-
actions," 316 the fear of losing business contracts to their competitors who
continue to pay bribes prevents many business leaders from discontinuing
corrupt practices.
3. Conferences
a. The 9th International Annual Anti-Corruption Conference, October
1999
The 9th International Anti-Corruption Conference (IACC) 3 17 was held in
Durban, South Africa due in part to concerns in the international commu-
nity regarding the extent of corruption in various African national govern-
ments.318 This event united 1600 professionals, practitioners and activists
in the fight against corruption. Leading officials from aid funding institu-
tions such as the World Bank (President James Wolfensohn), the UN, the
UNDP, the African Development Bank and South Africa (President Thabo
Mbeki) attended the Durban conference.
IACC conference topics included such diverse topics as the roles of
financial donors and of the creative arts in fighting corruption, and strate-
gies for countering money politics and laundering.319 The conference
yielded the "Durban Commitment," a statement expressing the partici-
pants' determination to combat corruption.320
312. See Transparency Int'l, supra note 293.
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314. See id.
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The conference ironically served as a pivotal counterpoint to an ongo-
ing South African scandal receiving significant media attention at the time
of the conference and involving the Lesotho-South Africa Highlands Water
Project.3 2 1 An official with the project was charged with accepting bribes
of $ 2 million from twelve international construction firms.3 22 World
Bank funding accounted for approximately $ 100 million of the $ 2.4 bil-
lion project;32 3 thus, the possibility exists that the World Bank may debar
some of the indicted companies from further Bank-financed projects.3 24
The scandal demonstrates that multilateral conventions alone are
insufficient to combat global business corruption. Instead, grassroots ini-
tiatives could provide the necessary means to modify cultural attitudes in
countries, such as South Africa, where the bribe-takers engage in business
as usual; and, finally, aid-funding institutions can and should leverage
their ability to lend capital.
b. Asian Development Bank/OECD Workshop on Combating
Corruption in Asian and Pacific Economies, October 1, 1999.
In October 1999 the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and OECD sponsored
a workshop on countering corruption in Manila, Philippines 32 5 Two hun-
dred representatives from the private sector and civil society attended the
workshop, held in Manilla, Philippines, as did participants from 36 coun-
tries. Participants included TI, the Pacific Basin Economic Council, the
UNDP, and the World Bank. The workshop group discussed strategies to
integrate anti-corruption initiatives at all levels, promote stronger enforce-
ment of anti-corruption laws, achieve greater transparency and integrity in
government, and develop codes of conduct in the private sector.
V. Coalitions Necessary to Successfully Eradicate Bribery and
Corruption: Involvement of Civil Society, Government and
Private Sector in Campaign Against Corruption
The three social institutions most responsible for and affected by globaliza-
tion are government, business, and civil society.3 26 However, government
and business institutions are often the perpetrators of corruption-with
business as the bribe-giver and government the bribe-taker. These groups
may therefore be less able or inclined to establish and maintain anti-cor-
ruption agendas. As noted by Peter Eigen, of the three institutions,
321. See Transparency Int'l, TI Newsletter, Bribers to Pay the Price (Dec. 1999) <http://
,vw.transparency.de/documents/newsletter/99.4/index.html>. See generally Paul Blus-
tein, Lesotho Bribery Charges Reads Like "A Who's Who of Dam-Builders:," INT'L HERALD
TMaB., Aug. 14-15, 1999.
322. See id.
323. See Blustein, supra note 321.
324. See id. (statement of Daoud Khairallah, World Bank Acting General Counsel).
325. See OECD, ADB/OECD Workshop on Combating Corruption in the Asia-Pacific
Region (Oct. 1, 1999) <http://www.oecd.org//daf/nocorruption/outreach99.htm#Asia
Pacific>.
326. Peter Eigen, The Role of Civil Society (visited Feb. 13, 2001) <http://magnet.undp.
org/DOCS/efa/corruption.htm#5. The Role>.
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only civil sbciety organizations have the public mandates and the global
potential to both declare the improvement of people's lives as the paramount
priority, and to do something meaningful about it. Only civil society organi-
zations can provide the impetus, the force, and the leadership to wage the
global war against corruption.327
It is impossible, however, for civil society to remedy corruption alone.
A coalition of the three pillars of the social structure-business, govern-
ment, and civil society-is of paramount importance in the fight against
corruption.328 Each of these sectors has the capacity, based on its unique
characteristics, to make critical contributions. 329 Government, when,
accountable to democratic control, and whose legitimacy thus is derived
from the people, can establish the legislative framework to criminalize cor-
rupt conduct.330 Government is also uniquely situated to provide the
access, leadership and resources necessary to reform governmental sys-
tems and institute measures to ensure transparency and accountability. 331
For any campaign against corruption to succeed, it is also necessary to
enlist the cooperation and support of the business community. The pri-
vate sector can assist in identifying problematic issues and is the ultimate
"testing ground for anti-corruption models-no rules and regulations will
check corruption if the gap between ethical standards and competitive
forces is too wide to be bridged."332
The legitimacy of civil society, like that of democratic government,
also emanates from the people; people who, without the profit motivation
of the private sector or the political self-interest of government, are con-
cerned with the broadest issues of social welfare in the local, regional,
national, and global communities. Civil society can provide the initiative
and leadership to build pivotal alliances among these three principal enti-
ties. These alliances are absolutely essential to the eradication of bribery
and corruption.
The alliance between government, business, and civil society is devel-
oping through the mechanisms already established by TI, OECD, OAS, and
other organizations with various representative groups of civil society.3 33
As noted by Peter Eigen, "I wish to leave no doubt that Transparency Inter-
national's highest priority is strengthening its national chapters and con-
tributing to the humanitarian and anti-corruption endeavors of civil
society worldwide." 33 4 Transparency International seeks to empower civil
society to function successfully. TI has developed a number of mecha-
nisms to involve local communities in its anti-corruption agenda, through
utilizing mechanisms such as the Integrity Pact, the National Chapters and
327. Id.
328. See id.
329. See id.
330. See id.
331. See id.
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333. See OECD, Anti-Corruption Unit, Private Sector/Civil Society (last modified Feb.
10, 2000) <http://www.oecd.org/daf/nocorruption/pscs.htm>.
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other efforts previously discussed.335
TI's Integrity Pact model is one of the most successful collaborations
between the three principal partners in the fight against corruption.3 36
This model unites government actors and business entities in the public
procurement process in an agreement to strive for transparency, accounta-
bility, and the elimination of bribery aimed at obtaining or retaining a con-
tract or other improper advantage. 337 Civil society's role in this model is to
monitor the agreement.338 These IPs have been utilized successfully in
public procurement projects both in Africa and South America.339
The OECD is also firmly committed to the involvement of civil society
in the battle against corruption. The OECD has stated that it is impossible
for any one of the three principal actors involved in corrup-
tion-government, the private sector, and civil society-to "address the issue
of corruption in isolation from the other two and arguably impossible to
tackle the issue effectively without the participation of all three."34° The
OECD regularly consults with partners and representatives from civil soci-
ety such as the Trade Union Advisory Group (TUAC), 341 the Business and
Industry Advisory Group (BIAC), 3 42 TI, and the International Chamber of
Commerce (ICC)3 43 through its Working Group on Bribery. These organi-
zations, by virtue of their official consultative status with the OECD, have
the opportunity to express their constituents' viewpoints in regard to criti-
cal developments such as the OECD Convention and its implementation.
Additionally, these groups partner with the OECD in various outreach
activities at the grassroots level to include business leaders, academics,
non-governmental activists, journalists, members of the chambers of com-
merce, and other professional groups in the exchange of information and
experience regarding international business corruption.344
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As noted previously, the OAS Convention focuses on the importance
of civil society in efforts to prevent corruption by including a provision for
participation by civil society and NGOs.3 45 Examples of such involvement
by civil society could include drafting educational systems to promote ethi-
cal values, enlisting the support of attorneys, accountants and auditors,
and, most importantly, incorporating the media in the fight against
corruption. 34 6
The International Federation of Journalists established a hotline
where journalists as well as public or private officials can report interna-
tional corrupt practices which are suppressed or remain unpublished.34 7
The hotline resulted from a conference held in Brussels in September 1999
on "Corruption and the Media."34 8 Thus, the media can greatly assist civil
society by reporting and revealing incidents of corruption and by provid-
ing mechanisms for whistleblowers to report incidents of corruption safely
and anonymously.
Conclusions
Global economic integration will only increase in the future. The world
today is dramatically different than it was during the Cold War era. Now,
with globalization, the geographical boundaries of the nation-states
assume ever-diminishing importance in business transactions. 3 49
One consequence of the international system of globalization is that
multilateral organizations have begun to move more actively toward
prohibitions against extraterritorial bribery to gain favorable treatment in
contractual negotiations in the early 1990s. Another manifestation of the
thrust toward globalization is that many former socialist economies are
becoming market driven systems.35 0 In the present global environment,
countries are beginning to realize that there is a direct relationship between
foreign investment and prosperity. 35 1 The uncertainty and the instability
of corruption serve as a deterrent to foreign investment. Transnational
firms are most likely to invest in countries where "the rules of the game are
clear."
3 5 2
The authors argue that the threat of lost business opportunities in the
integrated global marketplace will provide one of the most important
incentives for change. It is imperative that a unified solution to corrupt
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practices arises from the participation of multilateral organizations, NGOs
like TI, government, the private sector, and civil society.
A critical first step in the campaign against global corruption is to
change cultural norms and perceptions regarding bribery and corruption.
When anti-bribery norms are not internalized, cultural environment and
individual greed can overcome moral leanings. 35 3 A global, behavioral
anti-bribery norm must first be developed to provide a stable foundation
for an effective international legal order.3 54 In order for it to be effectively
curtailed, bribery and business corruption must eventually become viewed
by the business community, the global community, and society at large as
intuitively improper. Although the task of eradicating business corruption
may appear daunting, history teaches us that universal norms against for-
merly accepted reprehensible behavior can and do develop over time.
A pertinent analogy exists in the shift in the global attitude towards
slavery. Through centuries of history, civilizations such as Assyria,
Babylonia, Egypt, Persia, China, India, and the Americas regarded slavery
as an acceptable way of life.3 55 However, people gradually but increasingly
began to view the slave trade as immoral; so too are people now beginning
to change their views about corrupt business transactions. The passage of
the FCPA, and the implementing legislation of the OECD and the OAS Con-
ventions, can roughly be equated to the stage at which laws prohibiting
slavery were finally adopted. However, legislative adoption of antislavery
laws alone was insufficient to alter internalized norms regarding the pro-
priety of slavery. While other countries had already made slavery ille-
gal,35 6 grudging acceptance of antislavery norms evolved in the United
States only after the Civil War and resulted in the adoption of the 13th
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.35 7 Today, the global community as a
whole generally rejects the concept of slavery.
A similar cultural and institutional transformation will have to take
place in the world's attitudes toward business corruption-from acceptance
of bribery as a profitable and lucrative activity to its rejection as a morally
reprehensible and economically unacceptable behavior.358 Anti-bribery
laws standing alone cannot overcome the lust for greater profits by bribe-
givers (usually international businesses) nor the need or greed of those
that demand the bribes (usually public officials). Laws will have little
effect on secret bribery negotiations until cultural, governmental, and busi-
ness attitudes shift and the bribe-exchange transaction becomes an embar-
rassment.35 9 It is imperative that certain alliances be utilized fully in the
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fight against corruption. One such critical alliance consists of civil society,
business, and government.
The recent worldwide explosion in the forces of democratization and
globalization brought about significant changes in the composition of civil
society. There are many new and emerging democracies now opening the
door to the public policy debate on issues of corruption and bribery, and
several civil organizations exist that can publicize injustices and press for
institutional reforms.360 Civil society, with the aid of NGOs such as TI,
provides a much needed impetus to the global campaign against corrup-
tion by focusing attention on the injurious consequences of corruption.
Civil society plays a pivotal role in forging the necessary alliance of the
three pillars of social structure-government, the private sector, and civil
society itself. These three sectors must unite in order to successfully
address the relevant issues of corruption.
Finally, a coalition of the industrialized nations, developing and tran-
sitional nations, multilateral development banks, and NGOs representing
civil society, plus other pertinent entities at the multilateral, national, and
grassroots levels are pivotal complements to current anticorruption initia-
tives. Such a coalition would ideally utilize the following means: multilat-
eral conventions and international treaties (with their associated
harmonization of domestic legislation that carry penalties with a high level
of severe enforcement); anticorruption guidelines tied to funding in the
public procurement process; activities of NGOs (like TI with its Integrity
Pacts in the public procurement process and Corruption/Bribery Percep-
tion Indices); and grassroots initiatives by civil society that work to alter
cultural attitudes toward business corruption. The dynamic energy and
focus of such coalitions, utilizing these various strategies, will contribute
greatly to the fight against corrupt business activities.
bribe can be arranged or that a bribe will be accepted. No one is honored as a big briber
or a big bribee. See generally NooNAN', supra note 18.
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